






DODD–FRANK ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY:  
TOO BIG FOR THE CONSTITUTION? 
THOMAS W. MERRILL0F† & MARGARET L. MERRILL1F†† 
Title II of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010 establishes a new specialized insolvency regime, known as orderly liquidation, 
for systemically significant nonbank financial companies. While well intended, Title 
II unfortunately raises a number of serious constitutional questions. To vest 
authority in an Article III judge to appoint a receiver for such companies, yet also 
avoid a financial panic, Dodd–Frank requires that the judicial proceedings be 
conducted in secret, with no notice to the public or other interested parties on pain 
of criminal penalties, and that the judge rule on the petition to appoint the receiver 
within twenty-four hours of its filing. These unprecedented procedures raise serious 
questions under the Due Process Clause, Article III of the Constitution, and the 
First Amendment. The very broad discretion given to the executive branch to 
decide whether a distressed financial firm should be subject to mandatory liquidation 
under Title II, as opposed to conventional bankruptcy, also raises questions under the 
uniformity requirement of the Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause. Finally, Title II 
raises a number of potential issues under the Takings Clause. Given the extremely 
abbreviated time for judicial appointment of a receiver, the prohibition on any stay 
pending appeal, and the absence of any post-appointment judicial review of the 
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decision to place a firm into receivership, there are a number of vexing questions 
about how and when the constitutional issues raised by Title II might be presented 
to the courts. This Article examines these constitutional and procedural questions 
and argues that Congress should amend the Dodd–Frank Act to provide for plenary 
judicial review after rather than before a receiver is appointed. This simple change, 
along with amendments tightening some of the language that indicates when orderly 
liquidation rather than bankruptcy is appropriate, would help ensure that the new 
Title II authority is not undermined by a welter of constitutional claims—if and 
when it becomes necessary to use this authority to avert a future financial crisis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Dodd–Frank Act2F1 is the federal government’s most significant  
response to the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the severe recession that 
followed. If the precipitating event of the Great Depression was the 1929 
stock market crash, the September 15, 2008 filing of Lehman Brothers’s 
bankruptcy petition was the analogous triggering event for the Great 
Recession. 3F2 Within hours of the filing, credit markets froze up, and the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average plunged 504 points. 4F3 One day later, the federal 
government advanced funds, eventually totaling $182 billion, to prevent the 
collapse of insurance giant AIG. 5F4 Within weeks, a reluctant Congress 
created a $700 billion fund, known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), to provide emergency funds to financial firms regarded as “too big 
to fail.” 6F5  
Observers drew two main lessons from these traumatic events. The first 
was that conventional bankruptcy tools were inadequate when dealing with 
insolvency of a major investment bank like Lehman Brothers. 7F6 A significant 
portion of Lehman’s business consisted of making long-term loans funded 
by short-term borrowing. 8F7 Unlike a traditional bank, which makes long-term 
loans funded by government-insured deposits, Lehman obtained funds to 
support its lending activity through short-term borrowing from other 
financial firms secured by collateral such as mortgage-backed securities. 9F8 
When the housing bubble started to burst in 2007–2008, the value of this 
collateral became uncertain. Lehman’s counterparties demanded more and 
better collateral, and when rumors began circulating that Lehman might be 
insolvent, they refused to deal with Lehman at all, causing a general panic 
 
1 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
2 Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, vol. 1 at 13, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 
08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Examiner’s Report]. 
3 Id. (citation omitted).  
4 Id. (citation omitted).  
5 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 created TARP. See Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified in scattered sections of 12 
and 26 U.S.C.) (providing the requisite authority for the federal government to purchase 
distressed assets from financial institutions in an attempt to stabilize the U.S. economy and 
significant financial institutions). 
6 John L. Douglas & Randall D. Guynn, Resolution of US Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 
in DEBT RESTRUCTURING 311, 359 (Look Chan Ho & Nick Segal eds., 2011). 
7 Examiner’s Report, supra note 2, vol. 1 at 3.  
8 For background regarding the rise of the rehypothecation (repo) market and its role in the 
financial crisis, see generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC 
OF 2007, at 13-59 (2010).  
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among financiers analogous to a run on a bank by depositors. 10F9 For a variety 
of reasons, including the fact that collateralized debt obligations are exempt 
from the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, 11F10 the bankruptcy court was 
utterly helpless to stop the Lehman crisis from unfolding.  
The second lesson that quickly became evident was that the only alternative 
to bankruptcy under existing law was government bailouts of financial firms 
deemed too big to fail.11 Nearly all observers recognized the problem 
inherent in a policy of bailing out large financial firms when they become 
overextended. If the government issues a standing promise to bail out the 
biggest financial firms, it encourages such firms to engage in excessively 
risky behavior, increasing the likelihood of the very type of financial crisis 
everyone would like to avoid.13F12 Moreover, a government bailout guarantee, 
 
9 Former Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner’s explanation of Lehman’s collapse was 
that investors and counterparties lost confidence in its ability to meet its obligations, reminiscent 
of an old-fashioned run on the bank. TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON 
FINANCIAL CRISES 152, 164-68, 172-74, 176-83, 189 (2014). For a similar explanation from an 
academic economist, see generally GORTON, supra note 8. 
10 The Bankruptcy Code was amended in 2005 to exempt so-called “qualified financial  
contracts” (QFCs) from resolution in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 903–904, 119 Stat. 23, 160-66 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 9 (2006) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8) (2012)) 
(establishing that the appointment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as a 
conservator or receiver will not affect a party’s right to terminate, liquidate, accelerate, set-off, 
transfer, or modify previously entered QFCs). 
Some academic commentators have suggested that a better response to the Lehman Brothers’s 
experience and the financial crisis would be to eliminate this carveout in the Bankruptcy Code. See 
David A. Skeel, Jr., & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in 
Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 200-01 (2012); see also BANKRUPTCY NOT BAILOUT: A 
SPECIAL CHAPTER 14 (Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor eds., 2012) (urging the adoption of a 
new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with systemically significant financial firms). This 
complex topic, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
11 The Senate Report that laid the foundation for the Dodd–Frank Act noted that  
[w]hen Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, the markets panicked and the crisis 
escalated. With no other means to resolve large, complex and interconnected financial 
firms, the government was left with few options other than to provide massive 
assistance to prop up failing companies in an effort to prevent the crisis from spiraling 
into a great depression.  
Despite initial efforts of the government, credit markets froze and the U.S[.] 
problem spread across the globe. The crisis on Wall Street soon spilled over onto 
Main Street, touching the lives of most Americans and devastating many. 
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 43-44 (2010). 
12 Reducing this moral hazard was explicitly recognized as a basic purpose of the Dodd–
Frank Act. See Dodd–Frank Act § 204(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a) (2012) (stating that the Act’s 
purpose is “to provide the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a 
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even if only implicit, allows the largest financial firms to obtain credit on 
more favorable terms than ordinary financial firms, distorting incentives and 
altering the competitive landscape in undesirable ways. 14F13  
The American public, while perhaps not appreciating the nuances of the 
policy arguments, unquestionably regarded the bailouts as grossly unfair. 
Once the immediate crisis subsided, the bailed-out firms and their well-paid 
officers and directors appeared to have survived quite nicely, while ordinary 
folks still suffered the lingering effects of the downturn.  
The idea that the federal government rescued large financial firms with 
taxpayer dollars while ordinary citizens lost their jobs and watched their 
savings evaporate resulted in widespread anger. Politicians seemed to agree, 
at least publicly, that the general public should never again be taxed to prop 
up giant financial firms that the government deems too big to fail.15F14 
In light of these perceived lessons from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy 
and the regime of bailouts that followed, the Obama administration quickly 
concluded that a new insolvency regime was needed—one that would 
unwind “systemically significant” financial firms like Lehman Brothers 
while avoiding the undesirable incentives and public hostility to govern-
ment bailouts. The administration therefore proposed a new type of 
resolution authority, modeled after the process for shutting down insolvent 
banks and savings and loan associations, as part of the package of proposed 
financial reforms that eventually became the Dodd–Frank Act. 16F15 Ordinary 
banks and savings and loan associations that accept government-insured 
 
significant risk to the financial stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates such risk 
and minimizes moral hazard”). 
13 Recent studies have suggested that this advantage is significant. See Kenichi Ueda & B. 
Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 
37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3830, 3840 (2013) (using the expectation of government bailouts embedded 
in inflated credit ratings to estimate that the value of the structural subsidy given to systemically 
important financial institutions is as much as eighty basis points); see also Why Should Taxpayers 
Give Big Banks $83 Billion a Year?, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Feb. 20, 2013, 6:30 PM), http:// 
www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-02-20/why-should-taxpayers-give-big-banks-83-billion-a-
year-, archived at http://perma.cc/SYM6-FM8Q (“Small as it might sound, 0.8 percentage point 
makes a big difference. Multiplied by the total liabilities of the 10 largest U.S. banks by assets, it 
amounts to a taxpayer subsidy of $83 billion a year[,] . . . tantamount to the government giving the 
banks about 3 cents of every tax dollar collected.”).  
14 For example, in 2013, the Senate unanimously approved an amendment to a proposed 
budget for the 2014 fiscal year (which was not itself enacted) that called for eliminating all 
subsidies or other funding advantages for any financial firm having more than $500 billion in 
assets. 159 CONG. REC. S2284, S2289 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2013). 
15 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, RESOLUTION AUTHORITY FOR LARGE,  
INTERCONNECTED FINANCIAL COMPANIES ACT OF 2009, tit. XII ( July 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/title%20xii%20resolution%20 
authority%207232009finala.pdf [hereinafter Administration’s Combined Draft]. 
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deposits have long been subject to special resolution procedures that use a 
receivership or conservatorship; this authority was augmented before the 
enactment of Dodd–Frank to include provisions allowing the receiver or 
conservator to take systemic financial risk into account in certain circumstances.17F16 
The Administration’s Combined Draft would create a similar type of 
authority that applied to systemically significant financial firms, other than 
banks and savings and loan associations, such as bank holding companies 
and their subsidiaries. 18F17 Under this new resolution authority, government 
agencies would be given broad discretion to decide on a case-by-case basis 
when a bank holding company was in trouble and if its failure would pose a 
threat to the economy. 19F18 This decision would lead to a takeover by a  
government receiver or conservator, typically the FDIC, which would 
proceed to run the company as it resolved claims of creditors until the firm 
was liquidated or reorganized.20F19 Positive-value assets could be transferred to 
a “bridge financial company” and eventually folded into another firm. 21F20 If, 
while the firm was being wound down, financing was required to meet its 
obligations, the administration proposed that the necessary funds would be 
supplied by the Treasury. 22F21  
Like other provisions of the financial reform, the proposed resolution  
authority was politically controversial. Opponents argued that the proposal 
would institutionalize the hated regime of bailouts. 23F22 Proponents insisted 
that the new resolution authority would put an end to bailouts. 24F23 The 
legislative back-and-forth produced amendments that added further constraints 
on the discretion of the executive branch in using the new authority. 25F24 One 
 
16 The FDIC is charged with administering the resolution of failed or capital-deficient  
government-insured depositary institutions. The payment of deposits and other creditor claims by 
the FDIC is generally governed by the “least-cost resolution” rule. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) 
(2012). Under certain circumstances, however, the FDIC is allowed to diverge from the priority 
scheme established by the least-cost resolution rule. Specifically, if adherence to the rule would 
have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability, the FDIC is allowed to 
take alternative actions to mitigate these adverse effects, including making selective payments to 
non-depository creditors. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G).  
17 Administration’s Combined Draft, supra note 15, § 1204.  
18 Id. § 1203. 
19 Id. § 1209.  
20 Id. § 1209(a)(1)(G)(i).  
21 Id. § 1209(n). 
22 See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD–FRANK 
ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 117-18 (2011) (“The Obama administration made 
the same argument: Their framework for administrative resolution of large financial institutions 
didn’t ‘institutionalize bailouts,’ as critics complained; it would provide the benefits of bankruptcy 
without the uncertainty.”). 
23 Id.  
24 See infra text accompanying notes 112-39.  
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of these new constraints added by the Senate at the last minute—the 
requirement that a federal district judge make the final decision to appoint a 
receiver for a firm undergoing resolution—introduced the constitutional 
questions that are a substantial focus of this Article. 26F25 Other changes 
enhanced the punitive effects of the new resolution authority, raising further 
constitutional questions. 
In keeping with Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous adage that “[s]carcely 
any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner 
or later, into a judicial question,” 27F26 Dodd–Frank’s orderly liquidation 
authority is now the subject of a lawsuit. Eleven state attorneys general have 
sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
charging that the Act’s Title II violates the Due Process Clause, Article III 
of the Constitution, and the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy 
Clause. 28F27 The suit was dismissed by the district court for lack of standing 
and ripeness29F28 and is now on appeal before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 30F29 Whether or not the D.C. 
Circuit allows the case to proceed in its present posture, the plaintiffs’ 
arguments on the merits are surprisingly strong. Indeed, if the dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds is upheld, the constitutional arguments are likely to 
reemerge at the worst possible time—if and when another financial crisis 
hits and one or more systemically significant financial firms are slated for 
orderly liquidation. Sorting out these constitutional questions in the midst 
of a financial crisis could disrupt, or at least delay, the resolution process 
envisioned by Congress. It would be far better to fix these problems now by 
appropriate legislative amendment while the legal machinery associated 
with Title II is being established.  
Most of Title II’s constitutional infirmities stem from the decision to 
have a federal district judge appoint the receiver for a systemically signifi-
cant nonbank financial firm. In order to confer appointment authority on a 
 
25 See infra Sections III.A, IV.B.  
26 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred 
A. Knopf 1945) (1835).  
27 See generally Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, State 
Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-1032) [hereinafter Big 
Spring Second Amended Complaint]. The eleven states are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, 
Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia. 
28 State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127, 166 (D.D.C. 2013).  
29 Final briefs have been filed. Final Opening Brief for the State Appellants, State Nat’l 
Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, Nos. 13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 2014), ECF No. 45; Final 
Opening Brief of Private Plaintiffs–Appellants, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, Nos.  
13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 2014), ECF No. 47; Final Brief for Appellees, State Nat’l 
Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, Nos. 13-5247 & 13-5248 (D.C. Cir. May 9, 2014), ECF No. 44.  
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federal judge, and yet prevent the modern-day equivalent of a run on the 
bank, the statute prescribes a clandestine process giving the district judge 
just twenty-four hours to rule on a petition to appoint a receiver,31F30 prohibits 
providing any notice of the proceedings to creditors or other interested 
third parties, 32F31 and imposes criminal penalties on anyone who publicly 
discloses the pendency of the proceedings.33F32 Moreover, the district judge is 
permitted to consider only two factual issues under a highly deferential 
standard of review in deciding whether to order the liquidation of a major 
financial firm. 34F33 For good measure, the statute proscribes any stay pending 
appeal. 35F34 In effect, the statute seeks to draw on the prestige of the federal 
courts in making the appointment of a receiver while depriving parties with 
a vital stake in the matter of any notice or meaningful opportunity to be 
heard, handcuffing the court from acting in a manner consistent with 
judicial authority. 
The statute also gives the executive branch broad discretion to subject 
some nonbank financial firms to resolution leading to liquidation under 
Title II, while letting other firms remain subject to the ordinary bankruptcy 
process, including the possibility of reorganization. 36F35 Allowing the executive 
to pick and choose from different resolution regimes for firms in the same 
industry based on necessarily subjective determinations of the impact of the 
firm’s insolvency on “financial stability in the United States” 37F36 arguably 
violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.38F37 And within 
the new regime of orderly liquidation, the statute gives a federal agency—
typically the FDIC—wide latitude to depart from the principle that all 
creditors of the same class should be treated equally. 39F38 This too arguably 
violates the typical understanding of uniformity in the bankruptcy context. 
 
30 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(v), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v) (2012). 
31  Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (stating that the petition 
must be filed under seal and hearing is conducted on a strictly confidential basis). 
32 Id. § 202(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C). 
33 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv).  
34 Id. § 202(a)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(B). 
35 Id. § 201(a)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(8) (defining a covered financial firm as any firm so 
identified by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the criteria set forth in § 203(b), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5383(b)). For a more extensive discussion of what these criteria entail, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 144-50. 
36 Dodd–Frank Act § 203(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(4) (2012). 
37 The Constitution authorizes Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of  
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added). 
38 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(b)(4)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (b)(4)(A) (authorizing departure from 
equal treatment of similarly situated claimants if the FDIC determines that such action is 
“necessary” to maximize the value of the liquidated company’s assets, continue essential operations, 
maximize the value of the sale of assets, or minimize losses on the sale of assets). 
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The general question addressed by this article is whether the Dodd–Frank 
Act’s effort to end the “too big to fail” regime entails an exercise of power 
by the executive branch that is too big for the Constitution. We ultimately 
conclude that in its current form, the answer is yes. Nevertheless, the 
constitutional infirmities could easily have been avoided and hence are 
relatively easy to fix.  
Ordinary bank receiverships are commenced by an executive appointment 
of a receiver, followed by a right of judicial review unlimited as to the issues 
that can be raised 40F39—a process that allows affected interest holders to 
challenge the appointment of a receiver after the fact and permits the 
reviewing court to function in an appropriate judicial manner. This kind of 
ex post judicial review is undoubtedly constitutional in the context of a 
statutory regime designed to prevent a financial crisis. In fact, both the 
Obama administration’s proposed legislation and the House bill called for a 
receiver appointment process closely modeled after the bank receivership 
scheme. For reasons not fully explained, however, the Senate rejected this 
model and substituted the provisions calling for ex ante judicial appointment 
of a receiver. These provisions, coupled with draconian limitations on the 
court while making the appointment and the elimination of ex post judicial 
review, render the judicial process virtually meaningless. Thus, the constitu-
tional infirmities associated with Title II’s provisions for appointment of a 
receiver could be alleviated by simply amending the statute to incorporate 
the House provisions for appointing the receiver.  
Whether the Dodd–Frank Act’s alleged violations of the uniformity  
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause can be fixed is a harder question. 
Title II’s central objective is to provide the government with a new tool to 
avoid government bailouts or takeovers of troubled financial firms. It is 
debatable if such can be achieved via predictable rules laid down in advance. 
However, the loosely written provision that allows the FDIC to depart from 
equal treatment of similarly situated creditors 41F40 could almost certainly have 
been drafted more narrowly. Of course, in today’s legislative environment, 
obtaining such legislative fixes may be nearly impossible, making it much 
more likely that the courts will have to confront these issues. 
In Part I, we begin by examining the two statutory models for establishing 
the resolution authorities that served as a backdrop to the Dodd–Frank 
Act—bank receivership and bankruptcy law—and summarize the ways in 
which Dodd–Frank’s Title II deviates from both models. In Part II, we 
consider various legal avenues for raising a constitutional challenge to Title II, 
 
39 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(7); see also infra text accompanying notes 55-59.  
40 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(b)(4)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (b)(4)(A).  
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each of which is problematic. Part III analyzes the due process and Article 
III objections to Title II in greater detail, including possible strategies for 
avoiding these difficulties. Part IV turns to the potential constitutional 
issues under the Bankruptcy Clause and the First Amendment. Part V lists 
some possible takings issues, including an analysis of how the authority to 
impair or disregard security interests created prior to the enactment of Title 
II might be analyzed under the Takings Clause.  
I. TITLE II’S ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY (OLA) 
Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act sets forth a new “orderly liquidation 
authority” (OLA) designed to serve as a substitute for bankruptcy or 
government bailouts of financial firms deemed “too big to fail.” 42F41 Implicit in 
this newly created authority is the notion that the resolution of these large 
financial firms’ affairs under ordinary bankruptcy law or other insolvency 
laws would threaten the stability of the financial markets. The Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy is the obvious object lesson here.43F42 To avoid financial 
panic or various contagions analogous to a run on the bank, the statute 
assumes that the resolution of these systemically significant firms must 
occur rapidly and without any advance public notice. Thus, the process of 
appointing a receiver must occur “on a strictly confidential basis” without 
any public disclosure,44F43 and the judge who makes the appointment must 
rule within twenty-four hours. 45F44 This clandestine process deprives stake-
holders of any notice of a process that will lead to the liquidation of a major 
financial firm. Moreover, the extremely short deadline renders judicial 
oversight essentially meaningless, given the complexity of the matters 
involved. These draconian procedures represent a classic example of an 
unforced legislative error, for they render the statute vulnerable to constitu-
tional challenge on due process, Article III, and First Amendment grounds.  
 
41 Dodd–Frank Act, tit. II, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394. 
42 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 76-77 (2009), available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (“The federal government’s 
responses to the impending bankruptcy of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG were 
complicated by the lack of a statutory framework for avoiding the disorderly failure of nonbank 
financial firms, including affiliates of banks or other insured depository institutions. In the absence 
of such a framework, the government’s only avenue to avoid the disorderly failures of Bear Stearns 
and AIG was the use of the Federal Reserve’s lending authority. And this mechanism was 
insufficient to prevent the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, an event which served to demonstrate 
how disruptive the disorderly failure of a nonbank financial firm can be to the financial system and 
the economy.”).  
43 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).  
44 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(v), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v). 
  
2014] Dodd–Frank: Too Big for the Constitution? 175 
 
The OLA process may never be used. It may remain a proverbial “musket 
in the closet” that the government holds in reserve while arranging 
workouts with creditors or the sale or merger of a troubled firm in lieu of 
“orderly liquidation.” 46F45 If implemented with the consent of the distressed 
financial firm, the OLA process may not be contested. The statute specifically 
invites the troubled financial firm’s directors to consent to the OLA, 
dangling a carrot in front of them in the form of promised immunity from 
any shareholder or creditor actions for “acquiescing in or consenting in good 
faith to the appointment of the [FDIC] as receiver.” 47F46 It would take an 
intrepid director to battle with the executive branch over the fate of a 
financially troubled firm, knowing that any diminution in financial value 
attributable to such resistance could be challenged in future litigation by 
disgruntled creditors and shareholders, whereas capitulation to the government 
would result in the director’s immunity from such lawsuits. 
In any event, whether the OLA is used or merely threatened, the  
government’s credibility to use the new procedure will depend on whether 
relevant actors perceive this authority as constitutional. As we shall see, 
there are several features of Title II that give rise to serious questions on 
that front.  
The basic model for the OLA process is existing law that provides for  
administrative receiverships of FDIC-insured banks. 48F47 Dodd–Frank takes 
this bank receivership law and adds to it a number of provisions borrowed 
from the Bankruptcy Code, which is essentially a judicially supervised 
resolution process.49F48 As a result, the OLA is an administrative, rather than a 
judicial, resolution process—but one that hews more closely to the substantive 
law of bankruptcy than the law governing bank receiverships. Many of the 
constitutional issues raised by Title II stem from the unique provisions that 
govern the appointment of a receiver under the OLA.50F49 These provisions do 
not follow the template of either bank receivership law or bankruptcy law. 
Rather, they were adopted by the Senate during the final days of intense 
negotiation over what was to become the final version of the law. Accordingly, 
we begin with a brief review of the benchmarks established by bank  
 
45 See SKEEL, supra note 22, at 139-40 (arguing that even though Dodd–Frank’s resolution 
rules may violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, they are unlikely to ever be invoked 
and are more likely to be used as leverage in negotiations). 
46 Dodd–Frank Act § 207, 12 U.S.C. § 5387. 
47 SKEEL, supra note 22, at 117-27.  
48 See generally Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Dodd–Frank for Bankruptcy Lawyers, 
19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287 (2011).  
49 See infra Sections III.A, IV.B. 
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receivership and bankruptcy law and then trace these within the evolution 
of the Title II provisions by examining Dodd–Frank’s legislative history. 
A. Bank Receiverships and Bankruptcy 
1. FDIC Receivership Procedure 
Under current practice, banks that become financially distressed are 
nearly always put into a conservatorship or receivership in which the FDIC 
acts as conservator or receiver exercising powers under federal law. 51F50 It is 
theoretically possible for state-chartered banks to have a state-appointed 
receiver, but the FDIC can take over a state receivership if the bank has 
FDIC-insured deposits, which virtually all banks do. 52F51 Federal law requires 
either that the FDIC be appointed as conservator or receiver by the relevant 
bank-supervising agency, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) in the case of a federally chartered bank, 53F52 or that the 
FDIC appoint itself as receiver if the assets of the federal deposit insurance 
fund are at risk.54F53 Once the FDIC assumes control of the bank, the “depository 
institution” may commence an action in federal district court seeking an 
 
50 See PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL 
HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 15.01 (Matthew Bender, 2d ed. 2014) (“Closure 
can either take the form of an FDIC conservatorship or receivership. The purpose of a conserva-
torship is to conserve an institution’s assets until it can be sold or restored to viability as a going 
concern. The purpose of a receivership, in contrast, is to liquidate an institution or wind up its 
affairs. In virtually every case today, the conservator or receiver is the FDIC.”).  
51 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4)-(5) (2012) (permitting the FDIC to “appoint itself as sole  
conservator or receiver of any insured State depository institution” if any of certain enumerated 
conditions are met).  
52 See id. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (“The Corporation shall be appointed receiver, and shall accept 
such appointment, whenever a receiver is appointed for the purpose of liquidation or winding up 
the affairs of an insured Federal depository institution by the appropriate Federal banking agency, 
notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law.”). For any national bank, the decision to 
appoint a receiver is determined by the OCC at the discretion of the Comptroller. Id. § 191. The 
OCC’s decision to appoint a receiver is generally not subject to judicial review before the 
appointment takes effect. See U.S. Sav. Bank v. Morgenthau, 85 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1936) 
(holding that “where the Comptroller of the Currency has held a bank to be insolvent and has 
appointed a receiver for it, the court will not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the 
Comptroller, unless it appears by convincing proof that the Comptroller’s action is plainly 
arbitrary, and made in bad faith”). 
53 See id. § 1821(c)(4) (providing that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, 
the law of any State, or the constitution of any State, the Corporation may appoint itself as sole 
conservator or receiver of any insured State depository institution,” if the FDIC makes certain 
determinations, as described in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4)(A)-(B), in regards to the financial insuffi-
ciency of the insured State depository institution at issue). 
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order to dissolve the conservatorship or receivership. 55F54 The statutes author-
izing this form of review generally require that the action be commenced 
within thirty days of the appointment of the conservator or receiver. 56F55 The 
review provisions instruct the court either to confirm or dismiss the  
appointment of the conservator or receiver “on the merits” and include no 
limit on the issues the court may consider or the time the court may take in 
rendering its decision. 57F56 The statute authorizing ex post review of a decision 
by the FDIC to appoint a conservator for a federal bank specifies that the 
standard of review is whether the OCC’s appointment was “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.” 58F57 But the other review provisions are silent as to the standard of 
review.  
Taken as a whole, the statutory language strongly suggests that Congress 
contemplated that the district courts would engage in de novo review of any 
challenge to the FDIC’s appointment as receiver. The instruction to decide 
the matter “on the merits,” the juxtaposition of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard for conservatorships with silence about the standard for receiver-
ships, the more serious implications of receiverships—which lead to liquidation 
of the bank—and the fact that ordinarily there will be nothing resembling a 
formal record compiled by the relevant appointment authority to review all 
point to this conclusion. The few courts of appeals that have considered the 
matter have nevertheless held that the “arbitrary or capricious” standard of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)59F58 applies, 60F59 although some district 
courts have disagreed. 61F60 Whatever the correct standard of review, it is clear 
 
54 Id. § 1821(c)(7) (2012). Parallel provisions authorize judicial review of the OCC’s decision 
to appoint the FDIC as receiver of a federally chartered bank, id. § 191(b), review of a decision by 
the OCC to appoint the FDIC as conservator of a federally chartered bank, id. § 203(b), and the 
appointment of a conservator or receiver for a federally chartered savings association by the 
appropriate federal banking agency, id. § 1464(d)(2)(B). 
55 An exception is review of a decision by the OCC to appoint the FDIC as conservator, 
which must be commenced in twenty days. Id. § 203(b)(1).  
56 See id. § 191(b); id. § 203(b); id. § 1464(d)(2)(B); id. § 1821(c)(7).  
57 12 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2012).  
58 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
59 See, e.g., Woods v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, 1406-09 (5th Cir. 1987)  
(finding that a provision of the Home Owners’ Loan Act permitting the district court to remove a 
receiver appointed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board requires the district court to engage in 
only arbitrary and capricious review of the Board’s decision); Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. 
Home Loan Bank Bd., 794 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that the district court 
correctly applied the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard in an action challenging the 
appointment by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board of a receiver for a state-chartered, federally 
insured savings and loan association). 
60 See MCCOY, supra note 50, § 15.04[4] n.1 (citing the “smattering of district court opinions, 
which have been rejected by the courts of appeal[s] in other circuits, [that] have interpreted the 
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that there is no limitation on the issues that can be presented to the court in 
seeking to overturn the appointment of a conservator or receiver, nor is 
there any time limitation placed on the court in resolving these issues.  
What actually happens in a bank receivership, according to recent  
descriptive accounts, is roughly as follows. 62F61 First, the appropriate state or 
federal bank regulatory authority sends the FDIC a “failing bank letter” or 
the FDIC determines, based on its own information, that a bank is in 
distress. The FDIC then sends a “planning team” to the distressed bank to 
make a confidential assessment of its assets and liabilities. Based on this 
information, the FDIC develops an appropriate resolution strategy, most 
commonly a sale to another bank. 63F62 The FDIC creates an informational 
package about the bank, which it distributes to potential bidders identified 
by FDIC staff. Each bidder signs a confidentiality agreement and, if it so 
wishes, submits a bid for the bank or its assets. FDIC officials then evaluate 
the bids and recommend the lowest cost resolution to the FDIC Board. If 
the Board approves, the FDIC is officially appointed as the conservator or 
receiver. Such appointments typically occur late on a Friday afternoon. 
Over the weekend, the bank is shut down, its books are seized, its locks are 
changed, and its signage is modified; a new bank opens for business on 
Monday morning. 64F63 Subsequently, creditors of the failed bank will submit 
claims to the FDIC, which the agency resolves, giving priority to secured 
creditors and depositors.65F64 Any creditor dissatisfied with the FDIC’s 
resolution of its claim can bring an action in federal court seeking review of 
 
term ‘upon the merits’ found in statutory provisions for judicial review to authorize a broader 
standard of review”).  
61 The following summary is drawn from FDIC, THE RESOLUTION HANDBOOK (2003), 
available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook; John L. Douglas & Randall D. 
Guynn, supra note 6, at 311-77; Stanley V. Ragalevsky & Sarah J. Ricardi, Anatomy of a Bank Failure, 
126 BANKING L.J. 867 (2009); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and 
Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76 TEX. L. REV. 723, 727-31 (1998) (providing a brief overview of 
the regulatory framework for the banking and insurance industries). 
62 Ragalevsky & Ricardi, supra note 61, at 876. The disposition of a failing bank in this manner 
is often referred to as a purchase and assumption transaction (P&A), because the healthy bank 
selected by the FDIC agrees to purchase some portion of the failed bank’s assets and assume some 
portion of the failed bank’s deposit and other liabilities. Id. at 877. P&A transactions made up 
thirty-four of the forty resolutions that were carried out by the FDIC from January 2000 to 
August 2008. Id. at 876; see also SKEEL, supra note 22, at 122 (2011) (noting that P&A transactions 
are used in fifty-four percent of bank failures). 
63 Ragalevsky & Ricardi, supra note 61, at 885.  
64 See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(2)(C)(ii) (2012) (enumerating the subordination hierarchy for a 
failed bank’s liabilities).  
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the agency’s determination.66F65 Such actions are occasionally brought but 
rarely successfully. 67F66  
Although judicial review of the decision to commence a receivership is 
expressly authorized by statute, 68F67 it is fair to say that it is “extremely 
difficult” to persuade a court to set aside a receivership.69F68 Once a receivership 
has commenced, courts are highly unlikely to unwind it, because doing so 
would require reversing transfers of deposits and assets already completed. 
Moreover, it is unclear what, if anything, a bank stands to gain by securing a 
judicial order overturning a receivership. The suit would likely generate 
publicity about the regulators’ negative assessment of the bank’s financial 
condition, causing depositors to flee and potential borrowers to look 
elsewhere for loans. As a result, if the bank was not fully insolvent when the 
receivership commenced, it likely would be insolvent by the time the court 
set aside its receiver determination. Nevertheless, despite being rarely 
sought, judicial review is not meaningless. The very existence of the right to 
seek judicial review undoubtedly helps ensure that the power to seize banks 
will not be abused for illegitimate ends. 
In sum, there are several noteworthy points about bank receivership. 
First, the process is almost entirely administrative: the FDIC runs the 
process from beginning to end. Banks rarely mount a judicial challenge to a 
decision to appoint the FDIC as receiver, and courts play only a minor and 
episodic role in reviewing the FDIC’s resolution of claims once a receivership 
 
65 See id. § 1815(e)(3)(B) (providing for judicial review and administrative hearings by the 
FDIC for review of “the amount of any loss incurred by the [FDIC] in connection with any 
insured depository institution,” “the liability of individual commonly controlled depository 
institutions for the amount of such loss,” and “the schedule of payments to be made by such 
commonly controlled depository institutions”); id. § 1821(d)(6) (providing that a claimant may 
request administrative review by the FDIC of a claim or file suit on such a claim in the federal 
district court in the district within which the depository institution’s principal place of business is 
located). 
66 See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, OVERVIEW OF THE FDIC AS CONSERVATOR 
OR RECEIVER 6 (2008), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/ 
092608-Overview-FDICasConvervator-Receiver.pdf (noting that “cases reviewing FDIC actions 
as receiver have largely upheld the FDIC’s approaches”); see also SKEEL, supra note 22, at 123 n.8 
(citing an email from an FDIC official stating that few creditors seek judicial review of an FDIC 
action and that even when judicial review is sought, “changes in the outcome are rare”). 
67 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(7) (granting a failed bank the right to challenge receivership in 
federal district court). 
68 MCCOY, supra note 50, § 15.04[4]. For examples of courts conducting post-seizure review, 
see generally James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1996); McMillian v. FDIC, 81 
F.3d 1041 (11th Cir. 1996); DPJ Co. v. FDIC, 30 F.3d 247 (1st Cir. 1994); Haralson v. Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board, 837 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Parkway Executive Office Center, Nos. 96-
0121, 96-0122, 1998 WL 18204 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1998); Nashville Lodging Co. v. FDIC, 934 F. Supp. 
449 (D.D.C. 1996); Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. FDIC, 857 F. Supp. 976 (D.D.C. 1994). 
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is underway. Second, the process proceeds in secret until the moment the 
FDIC seizes control of the bank. Bank regulators and the FDIC do not 
announce a contemplated receivership, and they do not conduct public 
hearings before announcing the seizure. While bank officers and directors 
know a receivership is imminent, they understand that it is not in the bank’s 
best interest to disclose this information. Potential bidders for bank assets 
are subject to confidentiality agreements and communicate with the FDIC 
through secure channels so that their involvement remains secret. This 
secrecy is justified in that it helps avoid public alarm and a run on deposits, 
thereby minimizing government losses on deposit insurance. 
2. Bankruptcy Procedure 
Bankruptcy is very different from the FDIC’s receivership procedure. 
The bankruptcy process is not initiated by a government regulator but 
rather by the creditors of a distressed entity or, more commonly, by the 
debtor entity itself.70F69 For financial firms likely to be subject to Dodd–Frank’s 
orderly liquidation, the most likely bankruptcy option would be a petition 
seeking reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.71F70 A 
Chapter 11 petition presupposes that the value of keeping the firm in 
operation (the going concern value) after restructuring its debts is greater 
than a liquidation, the amount that would be obtained by selling off the firm’s 
assets and closing its doors. 72F71 If it turns out that the going concern value is 
less than the liquidation value of the firm, the petition will either be 
dismissed or converted to a Chapter 7 action during the proceedings. 73F72 
Although the Bankruptcy Code provides that a trustee can be named to 
manage the firm during reorganization, the existing management, which has 
greater expertise in running the firm, is commonly allowed to remain in 
place during reorganization. 74F73 Creditors are divided into classes, depending 
on their relative priority in demanding satisfaction of their claims. 75F74  
 
69 See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (setting out the petition procedure for voluntary bankruptcy by 
the debtor); id. § 303 (setting forth the petition procedure for involuntary bankruptcy of the 
debtor by creditors). 
70 See generally id. §§ 1101–1174. 
71 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 
452 (1999) (noting that the two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11 are preserving the going 
concern of the debtor and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors). 
72 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (allowing any party to request conversion from a Chapter 11 case to 
a Chapter 7 case for cause, including for continuing loss and the “absence of a reasonable 
likelihood of rehabilitation”). 
73 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 12 (5th ed. 2010). 
74 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2012). 
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If creditors are numerous, a creditors’ committee will represent them. 76F75 The 
overall goal of a Chapter 11 filing is to develop a plan of reorganization for 
the firm, which may call for the sale of some firm assets and restructuring 
the terms of the firm’s debts.77F76 The debtor in possession will negotiate with 
major creditors or the creditors’ committee to develop a plan that is “fair 
and equitable” to each class of claims. 78F77 Certain consequences flow from 
filing any petition for bankruptcy, most importantly the automatic stay of 
any collection of debts.79F78 While the Bankruptcy Code sets forth deadlines 
for certain actions, such as submitting a plan of reorganization,80F79 extensions 
are commonly obtained in proceedings of any complexity.81F80 
The bankruptcy process is essentially a judicial process. Federal district 
courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all bankruptcy cases 
governed by title 11 of the U.S. Code.82F81 District courts routinely refer 
bankruptcy filings to bankruptcy judges, who are considered Article I judges 
rather than Article III judges. 83F82 Bankruptcy judges enjoy significant  
independence and resolve contested matters in the same manner as district 
court judges, with adversarial public hearings featuring sworn witnesses, 
briefs, and written opinions.84F83 Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts are regarded 
as “adjuncts” to district courts, and district courts have the power to with-
draw the reference of cases or proceedings from bankruptcy judges, in whole 
 
75 Id. § 1102.  
76 See id. §§ 1121–1129 (outlining procedures for filing a reorganization plan, the contents of 
such a plan, and methods for accepting, modifying, and confirming the plan).  
77 Id. § 1129(b); see also BAIRD, supra note 73, at 77 (“The ambition of every lawyer whose 
client files a Chapter 11 petition is to persuade each group of creditors to consent to a plan of 
reorganization.”). 
78 Id. § 362.  
79 The debtor in possession has the exclusive right to file a plan for 120 days, a deadline 
which can be extended. Id. § 1121(b), (d). After that, other parties in interest may file a plan. Id. 
§ 1121(c). 
80 See id. § 1121(d)(1) (providing that upon request of a party in interest, and pursuant to 
notice and hearing, the bankruptcy court may extend the time period for filing a plan of reorgani-
zation); see also Novica Petrovski, The Bankruptcy Code, Section 1121: Exclusivity Reloaded, 11 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 451, 453 (“It is also commonly known that bankruptcy courts, almost 
routinely, extend the exclusivity period [for filing a plan of reorganization] two or more times after 
the first 120 days.”).  
81 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012). 
82 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1982) (explaining 
that “there is no doubt that . . . bankruptcy judges . . . are not Art. III judges” because bankruptcy 
judges are appointed for fourteen-year terms, can be removed by the judicial council of the circuit 
in which they serve for “incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical and mental 
disability,” and do not enjoy salary protection).  
83 District courts often have standing reference orders in place that automatically refer all 
bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2012). 
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or in part, for good cause. 85F84 So-called “core” matters that arise under federal 
bankruptcy law can be decided by bankruptcy judges, subject to review by 
district courts under the appropriate appellate review standard. 86F85 So-called 
“non-core” matters that arise under nonbankruptcy law, such as claims 
involving contract and tort law, are subject to de novo review by district 
courts. 87F86 Many provisions of the Code require that such actions can be 
taken only after notice and hearing are provided to creditors. 88F87 Whether 
actual notice and hearing are given in any particular instance is governed by 
norms derived from the law of due process.89F88 
In short, bankruptcy is a debt resolution process based predominately on 
negotiation and compromise, subject to judicial oversight. Bankruptcy 
judges operate much like other federal judges, federal district courts retain 
control over key decisions, and appellate review is available to challenge 
virtually any judgment. Prominently, bankruptcy is an open process. Of 
course, negotiations occur among different classes of creditors behind closed 
doors. However, all affected parties are entitled to notice and participation 
in critical decisions, such as approval of any reorganization plan. While bank 
receivership is essentially an administrative process, subject only to ex post 
judicial review, bankruptcy is a party-centered process in which negotiated 
solutions are judicially supervised and approved.  
 
84 Id. § 157(d); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2603-05 (2011) (summarizing the 
division of authority between the district courts and bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy 
Code). 
85 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (granting the district courts jurisdiction to hear appeals of all core 
proceedings arising under Title 11); Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2603 (“Parties may appeal final judgments 
of a bankruptcy court in core proceedings to the district court, which reviews them under 
traditional appellate standards.”). 
86 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (permitting a bankruptcy judge to hear a proceeding that is not a 
core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under Title 11 but requiring the judge to 
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, which in turn must 
consider the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings and conclusions and review de novo any matters 
as to which a party has timely and specifically objected). As a matter of constitutional law, “non-
core” claims include common law counterclaims and fraudulent conveyance claims, without regard 
to how they are designated by statute. See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 
2172-75 (2014) (allowing common law counterclaims and fraudulent conveyance claims to proceed 
as non-core claims, subject to de novo review by the district court).  
87 See U.S. BANKR. COURT FOR S. DIST. OF N.Y., GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF 
ASSET SALES 2-3 (2013), available at http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/6004-1-j-
Guidelines.pdf (identifying the procedures for the sale process of the debtor company pursuant to 
section 363 of Bankruptcy Code—including notice procedures, protections for the stalking horse 
buyer, bidding procedures, the form of the purchase agreement and auction guidelines, and the 
approval of the sale to the successful bidder—as matters which must be adjudicated before the 
bankruptcy court). 
88 See BAIRD, supra note 73, at 7-8. 
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B. Legislative History of Dodd–Frank’s OLA 
The process of commencing an OLA proceeding under Title II of the 
Dodd–Frank Act does not fully conform to either the FDIC banking model 
or the bankruptcy model. The Obama administration proposed legislation 
on July 22, 2009 (Administration’s Combined Draft) that contained the 
initial draft of what was to become Title II. 90F89 Title XII of this draft, titled  
“Enhanced Resolution Authority,” was largely drawn from existing banking 
legislation authorizing FDIC receiverships.91F90 In keeping with the banking 
model, the Administration’s Combined Draft provided for administrative 
appointment of a receiver, in this case by the Secretary of the Treasury. 92F91 
The draft also provided for a system of elaborate administrative checks 
before making such an appointment. The Federal Reserve Board and the 
Board of the FDIC, by a two-thirds vote, were to provide the Secretary 
with a “recommendation” as to the nature and extent of actions that should 
be taken regarding the bank holding company, and the Secretary was 
required to make certain prescribed findings. 93F92 The required concurrence of 
the three administrative bodies, a concept borrowed from FDIC receiver-
ship law, was known as the “three keys turning.” 94F93 The draft also followed 
banking law by authorizing the seized firm to file a judicial action within 
thirty days, requesting that the receivership be set aside.95F94 As under banking 
law, the administration’s draft language did not restrict the issues that the 
reviewing court was allowed to consider in such a proceeding, nor did it 
impose any time limit on the court’s review. The administration was 
undoubtedly aware that such a right of review is almost never exercised in 
the banking context. Consequently, although a firm’s right to seek judicial 
relief would be symbolically important to assure that the new resolution 
authority would not be abused, it would have little practical impact on the 
resolution process. 
 
89 See generally Administration’s Combined Draft, supra note 15. 
90 Id. §§ 1201–1211.  
91 Id. §§ 1203(b), 1204(b). 
92 Id. § 1203(a)-(c). 
93 See SKEEL, supra note 22, at 121 (“The decision whether to put a financial company into 
the resolution regime is governed by a process that has become known as ‘three keys turning.’”). 
The three agency or “three key” endorsement mechanism first appeared in the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). In order for the FDIC to diverge from 
the least-cost resolution rule required under the FDICIA, the Treasury must determine, in 
consultation with the President and following a recommendation by a two-thirds vote of the 
FDIC and Federal Reserve Board, that such divergence is justified in order to mitigate adverse 
effects to the financial stability of the economy as a whole. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2012). 
94 Administration’s Combined Draft, supra note 15, § 1205.  
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The House version of what became the Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173, 
largely tracked the Obama administration’s proposal in terms of appointment 
authority. 96F95 The House bill followed the administration’s draft by providing 
for administrative appointment of a receiver by the Secretary of the Treasury 
and by prescribing a “three keys turning” procedure before the Secretary 
could act. 97F96 Further, like the administration bill, the House version provided 
for a thirty-day period to seek judicial review after the receivership com-
menced. 98F97  
The Senate had somewhat different ideas. The Senate bill, proposed by 
the Democratic leadership in April 2010, followed the House bill in requiring 
“three keys turning” before a receiver could be appointed. 99F98 However, the 
Senate bill lodged the appointment authority not in the Secretary of the 
Treasury but rather in a panel composed of three bankruptcy judges from 
the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, acting on petition by the 
Secretary of the Treasury. 100F99 The discretion of the three-judge panel was, 
however, tightly constrained. The panel could consider only a single issue: 
whether the Secretary of the Treasury’s determination that the firm was in 
default or in danger of default was supported by “substantial evidence.”101F100  
The only explanation provided by the Senate Report for adding the 
bankruptcy judge panel—what might be regarded as a fourth “key turning”—
was that orderly liquidation of nonbank financial firms should be reserved 
for truly exceptional cases. 102F101 The Report stated that “the threshold for 
triggering orderly liquidation authority should be very high,” which apparently 
provided the rationale for adding “review and determination by a judicial 
panel.” 103F102  
One can speculate further as to why the bill’s sponsors selected a panel 
of bankruptcy judges for this role. Bankruptcy judges have expertise in 
recognizing when firms are in default or in danger of default. Thus, although 
not mentioned by the Senate Report, injecting a panel of bankruptcy judges 
into the appointment process was presumably aimed at enhancing the 
 
95 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
§§ 1601–1617 (2009). 
96 Id. § 1603(a)(1). 
97 Id. § 1605. 
98 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 203 (as substituted 
Apr. 29, 2010). 
99 Id. § 202(a).  
100 Id. § 202(b)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv). 
101 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010) (explaining that “[t]he orderly liquidation authority 
could be used if and only if the failure of the financial company would threaten U.S. financial 
stability”). 
102 Id.  
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legitimacy of what would otherwise be a purely executive branch determination 
to liquidate a major nonbank financial firm.  
The introduction of this new condition to the orderly liquidation process 
nevertheless created a serious practical difficulty relative to the “three keys” 
approach advocated by the administration and adopted in the House bill. 
The three keys—the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Treasury—are all 
administrative agencies and are conditioned to act in secret, as when 
banking regulators and the FDIC move to declare a bank receivership. 
Thus, unless there is a leak, the administrative recommendations and 
determinations required by the three keys should not trigger a panic in 
financial markets or a contagion analogous to a run on the bank. Bankruptcy 
judges, in contrast, are accustomed to operating in an open fashion charac-
teristic of American judicial processes. This difference in the conventions of 
administrative and judicial actors raised the question of how the “substantial 
evidence” review required of the bankruptcy judge panel could be included 
in the receivership appointment process without jeopardizing its confidential 
nature. 
The Senate bill’s answer (although not discussed in the Senate report) 
was to impose a series of extraordinary constraints upon the bankruptcy 
judge panel. The petition for appointment of a receiver would be filed 
under seal 104F103 and the proceedings before the panel of bankruptcy judges 
held “[o]n a strictly confidential basis,” 105F104 with criminal penalties for 
disclosure. 106F105 Although the subject financial firm would be notified, its 
creditors, counterparties, and other stakeholders would be kept in the 
dark. 107F106 The panel would also have to rule very quickly—within twenty-four 
hours of receiving the filed petition. 108F107 The Senate bill did not address what 
would happen if the panel failed to make its decision within the requisite 
 
103 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 202(b)(1)(A)(ii) 
(as substituted Apr. 29, 2010). 
104 Id. § 202(b)(1)(A)(iii). 
105 Id. § 202(b)(1)(C). 
106 Id. § 202(b)(1)(A)(iii) (“On a strictly confidential basis, and without any prior public 
disclosure, the Panel, after notice to the covered financial company and a hearing in which the 
covered financial company may oppose the petition, shall determine, within 24 hours of receipt of 
the petition filed by the Secretary, whether the determination of the Secretary that the covered 
financial company is in default or in danger of default is supported by substantial evidence.”).  
107 Id.  
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time period. 109F108 Once the petition was granted, any stay or injunction 
pending appeal to the courts would not be permitted. 110F109  
These provisions are jarring if one thinks of the panel of bankruptcy 
judges as operating as a court. However, the constitutional issues presented 
by the provisions are diminished by bankruptcy judges’ status as Article I 
judges. For constitutional purposes, bankruptcy judges are very similar to 
administrative law judges (ALJs) in the executive branch. 111F110 Thus, the role 
of the bankruptcy judge panel under the Senate bill was not significantly 
different from a hypothetical provision requiring a panel of Treasury 
Department ALJs to determine that there is substantial evidence a firm is in 
default or danger of default. 112F111 Moreover, the Senate provision precluding 
any stay of the panel’s order pending appeal is not terribly different from 
the judicial review provision under the banking law, which provides for 
judicial review only after a receivership has commenced. 113F112 Allowing an 
appeal without a stay is functionally similar to allowing an appeal only after 
a receivership has commenced, provided the court has authority to set aside 
the receivership.  
There was, however, a further important difference in the Senate bill’s 
judicial review provisions. The Obama administration’s proposal and the 
House bill contained no limitation on the legal or factual issues that could 
be presented to the court in an ex post challenge of the appointment of a 
receiver. These proposals, like the banking legislation on which they were 
modeled, thus allowed the reviewing court virtually unbridled discretion in 
the issues it could consider and appeared to contemplate de novo review as 
to both fact and law. Under the Senate bill, by contrast, any appeal to the 
courts from the determination of the bankruptcy panel would be limited to 
whether the Secretary’s determination that the firm was in default or in 
 
108 Id. § 202(b)(1)(A)(iv) (stating merely that the panel’s order authorizing the Secretary of 
the Treasury to appoint the FDIC as receiver, or its written statement of reasons it will not issue 
such an order, shall be provided to the Secretary “immediately”). 
109 Id. § 202(b)(1)(B). 
110 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1982) (“It is 
undisputed that the bankruptcy judges . . . do not enjoy the protections constitutionally afforded 
to Art. III judges. The bankruptcy judges do not serve for life subject to their continued ‘good 
Behaviour.’ Rather, they are appointed for 14-year terms, and can be removed by the judicial 
council of the circuit in which they serve on grounds of ‘incompetency, misconduct, neglect of 
duty, or physical or mental disability.’ Second, the salaries of the bankruptcy judges are not 
immune from diminution by Congress. In short, there is no doubt that the bankruptcy judges 
created by the Act are not Art. III judges.” (citation omitted)). 
111 Such a provision, if not subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury, might  
nevertheless give rise to objections under Article II. 
112 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(7) (2012) (allowing depository institutions to seek judicial review of 
the FDIC’s appointment as receiver but only within thirty days after the appointment). 
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danger of default was supported by substantial evidence 114F113—a far more 
restrictive right of judicial review than that provided by the bank receivership 
laws. Of course, as we have seen, the right of judicial review is virtually 
never exercised in the bank receivership context. Still, a right to judicial 
review is an important safeguard, and limiting review to a single factual 
question under a deferential standard of review is a much weaker form of 
protection against executive abuse than that provided by the banking laws.  
Less than a month after the Senate bill was released, Senator Chris 
Dodd, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and the floor 
manager of the legislation in the Senate, along with Senator Richard 
Shelby—the senior Republican on the Senate Finance Committee, who had 
filed a dissenting report to the original Senate bill 115F114—proposed a series of 
amendments to the Senate bill. 116F115 The first of these amendments changed 
the method of appointing a receiver to commence the orderly liquidation 
process. Rather than appointment of a receiver by a panel of bankruptcy 
judges on petition by the Secretary of the Treasury, the amendment provided 
that the receiver would be appointed by the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia. 117F116 For the first time, the receiver was to be 
appointed by an Article III judge, not by an executive branch agency or a 
panel of Article I judges. The modified Senate bill also changed the standard 
of review that the District Court would apply from substantial evidence to 
“arbitrary and capricious” and added that the court was to consider whether 
the firm satisfied the statutory definition of a “financial company,” as well as 
whether the firm was in default or in danger of default. 118F117 No explanation 
for these changes was offered. These amendments were adopted and 
incorporated into the final Senate version of the legislation, described as an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute of H.R. 4173.119F118 The Senate passed 
this revised bill on May 20, 2010.120F119 
 
113 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. 
§ 202(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2010). 
114 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 231-51 (2010) (providing minority views of Senator Shelby, Senator 
Bennett, Senator Bunning, and Senator Vitter). 
115 156 CONG. REC. S3139-40 (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby) 
(describing the “Dodd–Shelby amendment,” which aimed to “clarif[y] and tighten[] the language 
in the bill regarding resolution and the powers of the Fed, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
the Treasury, and others to prevent bailouts”).  
116 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, H.R. 4173 EAS, 111th Cong. § 202 
(a)(1)(A)(i) (as substituted in Senate, May 20, 2010). 
117 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii). For the Senate’s proposed definition of “financial company,” see id. 
§ 201(10).  
118 See generally id. 
119 156 CONG. REC. S4078 (daily ed. May 20, 2010). 
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The public record is silent as to who proposed that the receiver be  
appointed by an Article III judge or why this change was thought to be 
important. Circumstantial evidence suggests at least one Senator must have 
insisted on this unusual form of ex ante review as a condition of his or her 
vote. Senator Dodd needed sixty votes to avoid a filibuster. 121F120 To obtain 
sixty votes, Senator Dodd had to secure the support of several shaky 
Democrats plus at least two Republicans, including that of the newly elected 
Senator from Massachusetts, Scott Brown. 122F121  
When the divergent House and Senate bills went to the Conference 
Committee, the House conferees listed as one of their requested changes 
the elimination of the Senate’s recently adopted provision for ex ante 
judicial review. 123F122 The Senate refused, without explanation. 124F123 The House 
again insisted on the change, 125F124 but the Senate refused to relent. 126F125 At that 
point, the House capitulated. A plausible inference is that the Senate 
conferees believed they could not abandon the provision for judicial  
appointment authority without endangering the razor-thin margin needed 
for sixty votes to approve the legislation. Regardless, the Senate version, 
calling for appointment of the FDIC as receiver by an Article III court, was 
 
120 See ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS: HOW AMERICA’S ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION 
WORKS AND HOW IT DOESN’T 278 (2013) (commenting that the Senate of the 111th Congress 
(2009-2010) “began to operate on the assumption that nothing contentious could win approval 
without a supermajority of sixty votes, a new impediment to legislative action”). 
121 Id. at 267-328; see also GEITHNER, supra note 9, at 416-24; Jia Lynn Yang, A Key Republican 
Vote Keeps Banking Curbs In Play, WASH. POST, June 23, 2010, at A12 (noting that Senator Brown 
was likely to get the concessions he demanded, because his vote was critical for approval of the 
House–Senate draft).  
122 STAFF OF H. FIN. SERVS. SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY & TECH., 
111TH CONG., HOUSE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO TITLE II (Comm. Print June 16, 2010), 
available at http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/FinancialSvcsDemMedia/file/key_issues/ 
Financial_Regulatory_Reform/TITLEII_OFFER.pdf. 
123 STAFF OF H. FIN. SERVS. SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY & TECH., 
111TH CONG., HOUSE COUNTEROFFER (Comm. Print June 23, 2010), available at http:// 
democrats.financialservices.house.gov/FinancialSvcsDemMedia/file/key_issues/Financial_Regulatory_ 
Reform/Conference_on_HR_4137/Title_II/Title_II_House_Counteroffer_6_23_2010.pdf (stating that 
“THE HOUSE INSISTS ON ITS ORIGINAL OFFER”).  
124 Id. (stating that “[t]he Senate . . . [d]oes not accept the House offer to replace the ex ante 
judicial review process with an ex post judicial review process”).  
125 STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG., 
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approved by the Conference Committee, adopted by both the House and 
Senate, and signed by the President. 127F126  
C.  OLA as Enacted 
The relevant provisions of Title II, as enacted, can be briefly summa-
rized. The process preceding a petition to the District Court for the District 
of Columbia for appointment of a receiver is described as a “systemic risk 
determination” by the statute. 128F127 A systemic risk determination requires the 
Department of the Treasury to establish that the conditions warranting 
orderly liquidation have been met, as specified through seven affirmative 
findings:  
1. The financial company must be in default or in danger of default; 129F128 
2. The failure of the financial company would have serious adverse 
effects on financial stability in the United States; 130F129 
3. No viable private sector alternative is available to prevent default; 131F130 
4. Any effect of a receivership on creditors, counterparties, and shareholders 
would be “appropriate” given the benefits of a receivership in terms 
of preserving financial stability;132F131 
5. Establishing a receivership would avoid or mitigate the adverse effects 
on stakeholders relative to not undertaking such action;133F132 
6. The company has been ordered by regulators to convert all of its  
convertible debt instruments;134F133 and 
7. The company satisfies the definition of a financial company. 135F134 
 
126 H.R. REP. NO. 111-517 (2010) (Conf. Rep.); see also Remarks on Signing the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 617 ( July 21, 
2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201000617/pdf/DCPD-201000617.pdf.  
127 Dodd–Frank Act § 203, 12 U.S.C. § 5383 (2012). 
128 Id. § 203(b)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(1). 
129 Id. § 203(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2). 
130 Id. § 203(b)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(3). 
131 Id. § 203(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(4). 
132 Id. § 203(b)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(5). 
133 Id. § 203(b)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(6). 
134 Id. § 203(b)(7), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(7). There are four categories of financial companies 
subject to the Title II orderly liquidation authority under Dodd–Frank:  
1. Bank holding companies, id. § 102(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(1); id. § 201(a)(11)(B)(i), 12 
U.S.C. § 5381(a)(11)(B)(i); id. § 203(a)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(A); 
2. Nonbank financial companies having at least eighty-five percent of their gross revenue or 
consolidated assets derived from activities that are financial in nature or incidental to  
financial activity, including the ownership or control of one or more insured depository 
institutions, id. § 102(a)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(4); id. § 201(a)(11)(B)(ii)-(iii), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5381(a)(11)(B)(ii)-(iii); id. § 203(a)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(A);  
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The statute also adopts the three keys turning approach that initially 
appeared in the Administration’s Combined Draft, meaning that the 
Secretary of the Treasury must obtain the written recommendation,  
supported by a two-thirds vote, of the members of both the Federal Reserve 
Board and the FDIC. 136F135 In addition, the statute requires the Secretary to 
consult with the President before filing a petition. 137F136  
The statute does not establish any right to participate in this administrative 
process, although the Treasury could promulgate regulations providing 
affected private interests with notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
appointment of a receiver. 138F137 But the assumed need for secrecy would seem 
to preclude granting any such rights, and there is no indication that the 
Treasury has contemplated such regulations. However, the statute does 
require the Secretary to notify the covered financial company when making 
the determination to file a petition, and there could be a gap in time 
between the Secretary’s notification of the “determination” and the filing of 
the petition in court. 139F138 This would give the financial company some time to 
prepare for the court proceedings. But again, the statute does not require 
 
3. Subsidiaries of the financial companies identified in the first two categories, except for 
those subsidiaries that otherwise qualify as insured depository institutions or insurance 
companies, id. § 201(a)(11)(B)(iv), 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(11)(B)(iv); id. § 203(a)(1)(A), 12 
U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(A); and  
4. Entities that qualify as brokers and dealers and are accordingly registered with the SEC 
and members of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, id. § 201(a)(7), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5381(a)(7); id. § 203(a)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(B). 
135 Id. § 203(a)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(A). Different administrative entities must pro-
vide written recommendations if the covered financial firm is a broker/dealer or an insurance 
company. Id. § 203(a)(1)(B)-(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(B)-(C). 
136 Id. § 203(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b). 
137 The FDIC’s regulations implementing Title II do not address the process leading up to 
appointment of a receiver. See generally Orderly Liquidation Authority, 12 C.F.R. §§ 380.1–.53 
(2014). To date, the Department of the Treasury has not promulgated any regulations regarding 
how notice of its receivership determination must be provided to the failing financial company, 
much less whether such notice must also be provided to affiliated parties with significant interests 
at stake. While the possibility of some future regulation along these lines is not out of the 
question, given the Treasury’s objection to the forty-eight hours’ advance notice requirement for 
any receivership petition to the D.C. District Court (a requirement contained in the originally 
issued Local Civil Rule 85), any rule regarding the provision of advance notice to anyone 
implicated by the Treasury’s receivership decision certainly seems unlikely. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-735, BANKRUPTCY: AGENCIES CONTINUE RULEMAKINGS 
FOR CLARIFYING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY 15-16 (2012) 
(reporting that the Treasury Department objected to requirements in the original D.C. District 
Court Local Civil Rule 85 that it provide an additional forty-eight hours’ notice before filing a 
petition to invoke OLA and, as a result, the court revised the final rule to add the language “to the 
extent feasible”). 
138 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
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that the notification of the determination occur before filing of the petition, 
and the concern for swift, secret action would work against giving the 
covered firm any realistic amount of time to prepare to do battle in court.  
Once the executive branch decides that a financial firm should be placed 
in receivership, it files a petition for appointment of a receiver under seal 
with the District Court for the District of Columbia. 140F139 The statute provides 
for stiff criminal penalties for anyone who “recklessly” discloses a determi-
nation to file a petition, the content of the petition, or “the pendency of 
court proceedings.” 141F140 Creditors and other stakeholders receive no notice 
and have no statutory way of intervening to defend their interests. If the 
court does not rule on the petition within twenty-four hours, it is automatically 
granted. 142F141 A covered financial firm will thus be given a mere twenty-four 
hours’ notice that the Treasury wants it liquidated, during which time the 
firm and its attorneys must review the Treasury’s petition and findings, 
prepare a rebuttal and file it with the court, and persuade the court, in a 
hastily convened hearing, to reject the petition. 143F142 
The statute also severely limits what issues the court can consider. The 
court is permitted to consider only the Secretary’s determinations that the 
firm is a “financial company,” as defined by the Act, and that the firm is “in 
default or in danger of default.” 144F143 Moreover, the court may consider only 
whether these two determinations are “arbitrary and capricious.” 145F144 The 
statute provides that if the District Court finds either of the Secretary’s 
determinations to be arbitrary and capricious, the court must remand to the 
Secretary and afford the Secretary “an immediate opportunity to amend and 
refile the petition.”146F145 No other relief is mentioned, implying that the Secretary 
can continue to refile until the District Court finally grants the petition.  
The firm may appeal the District Court’s findings within thirty days to 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and petition for a 
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court within thirty days of the circuit 
 
139 Id.  
140 Id. § 202(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C). 
141 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(v), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v). 
142 The statute directs the District Court for the District of Columbia to adopt rules imple-
menting the provisions for appointment of a receiver. Id. § 202(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(b). They were 
adopted by Local Civil Rule 85 on July 6, 2011. D.D.C. CIV. R. 85; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNT-
ABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-735, BANKRUPTCY: AGENCIES CONTINUE RULEMAKINGS FOR 
CLARIFYING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY 15-16 (2012). For 
further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 275-276.  
143 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
144 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II). 
145 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv)(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(II).  
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court’s ruling. 147F146 But no stay is allowed pending appeal, so the receivership 
moves forward once the petition is granted, even if the firm appeals.148F147 The 
statute again limits the issues that can be considered by the court of appeals 
and the Supreme Court; like the district court, these appellate courts may 
only inquire about whether the findings that the firm is a covered financial 
firm and is in default or in danger of default are “arbitrary and capri-
cious.” 149F148 Indeed, the language of the statute is emphatic in limiting the 
issues that may be considered on appeal, stating that review “shall be 
limited” to these two issues. 150F149 It is not clear what relief the D.C. Circuit 
and the Supreme Court can grant if they conclude that one or both of the 
reviewable determinations is arbitrary and capricious. Since the only relief 
the district court can provide is a remand, arguably the only relief available 
from the appellate courts would be a remand to the district court with 
instructions to remand to the Secretary for more detailed findings. 
Once the district court grants the petition appointing the FDIC as  
receiver of the covered financial firm, the process moves out into the open. 
The statute describes in excruciating detail a special kind of receivership 
that in some respects resembles an FDIC receivership of a bank and in 
other respects resembles ordinary bankruptcy, with the FDIC exercising 
most of the powers of a debtor in possession or trustee in bankruptcy. 151F150 
After its appointment, the FDIC as receiver exercises all the powers of the 
financial firm, including the power to oversee the firm’s daily operations, 
hire and fire employees, and retain the services of third-party vendors. 152F151 
But the FDIC also has powers resembling those of a bankruptcy court, 
including the powers to order a stay of further proceedings to collect debts 
against the covered financial firm, 153F152 unwind fraudulent and preferential 
transactions, 154F153 bring actions to collect monies owed to the firm, 155F154 and 
consider and resolve claims of various classes of creditors against the firm. 156F155  
It is important to note that any creditor dissatisfied with the FDIC’s 
resolution of a “claim” can bring a judicial action in the United States 
District Court where the covered financial firm has its principal place of 
 
146 Id. § 202(a)(2)(A)(i), (B)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(2)(A)(i), (B)(i). 
147 Id. § 202(a)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(B). 
148 Id. § 202(a)(2)(A)(iv), (B)(iv), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(2)(A)(iv), (B)(iv). 
149 Id. 
150 See generally Baird & Morrison, supra note 48 (highlighting the core congruities between 
the OLA under the Dodd–Frank Act and the Bankruptcy Code). 
151 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(A). 
152 Id. § 210(a)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(B). 
153 Id. § 210(a)(11)(A)-(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(11)(A)-(B). 
154 Id. § 210(a)(1)(B)(ii), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
155 Id. § 210(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(2). 
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business, and the court will rule on the claim. 157F156 A “claim” is “any right to 
payment.”158F157 Thus, insofar as the interests implicated by orderly resolution 
under Title II can be reduced to monetary claims against the firm in 
receivership, the statute affords an opportunity for the claimant to have her 
day in court. As adopted, however, Title II requires that every firm be 
liquidated, 159F158 that stockholder equity be wiped out before creditor claims are 
compromised, 160F159 that creditors are entitled to no more than they would have 
received in a liquidation in bankruptcy,161F160 that all officers and directors 
responsible for the financial collapse be dismissed,162F161 and that the compensation 
received by such officers within two years of the receivership be clawed 
back. 163F162 Because these consequences are mandated by law once a receiver is 
appointed, the only possible avenue for challenging them is to challenge the 
appointment of the receiver. And, as described above, the provisions for 
making such a challenge are so severely limited that they are meaningless. 
Some decisions, such as a determination that an officer was “responsible” 
and hence must be dismissed, could conceivably be challenged by filing a 
claim for backpay with the receiver, and, upon denial of this claim, challenging 
the denial of the claim in court. But, under the Dodd–Frank Act, there is no 
mechanism to seek review of the decision to strip an officer or director of 
his or her position before dismissal. 164F163 Nor is there any provision for court 
approval of other significant actions by the FDIC, such as the creation of a 
bridge financial company, 165F164 the sale of assets, 166F165 or the final liquidation of 
the covered firm. 167F166 In its current form, the Dodd–Frank Act includes no 
provision that would allow any of these decisions to be reviewed by any 
court.  
 
156 Id. § 210(a)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(4). 
157 Id. § 201(a)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(4).  
158 Id. § 214(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5394(a). 
159 Id. § 206(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(2) (2012). 
160 Id. § 210(d)(2)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(d)(2)(B). 
161 Id. § 206(4)-(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(4)-(5). 
162 Id. § 210(s), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(s). 
163 See id. § 206(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(5) (the FDIC is required to “ensure that the members 
of the board of directors (or body performing similar functions) responsible for the failed 
condition of the covered financial company are removed, if such members have not already been 
removed at the time the Corporation is appointed as receiver”); see also id. § 210(e), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5390(e) (stating that “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or 
functions of the receiver”). 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES: THE WHO AND THE WHEN 
A variety of potential constitutional challenges could be made to Title 
II. The secret, twenty-four hour proceeding in which the FDIC is appointed 
receiver by the District Court of the District of Columbia could be challenged 
for violating due process or Article III. The scheme could also be challenged 
for violating the “uniformity” requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause or the 
First Amendment. One could also imagine challenges under the Takings 
Clause, depending on how certain issues are resolved during the receivership. 
But we must first consider who can bring these sorts of constitutional claims 
and when they might be advanced.  
We will discuss three possibilities: (1) raising constitutional claims  
defensively in the district court in response to the petition by the Secretary 
of the Treasury asking for appointment of a receiver; (2) filing an independent 
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to enjoin the receivership once it is approved 
(but before it has taken significant steps to unwind the firm); and (3) filing 
an action to enjoin the appointment of a receiver before the Secretary files a 
petition to appoint a receiver. The last option is the avenue being pursued 
by the state attorneys general in the pending Big Spring litigation. 168F167  
A. Raising Claims by Defense 
Ordinarily, raising constitutional claims defensively would be the least 
problematic course of action. If the government files a legal action demanding 
the defendant’s person or property, there is no doubt the defendant can 
raise any constitutional objections he or she may have by way of defense. 169F168 
Standing is clearly established: concrete injury has either occurred or is 
“certainly impending.” 170F169 Jurisdiction is based on the authority invoked by 
 
167 Big Spring Second Amended Complaint, supra note 27. 
168 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372 (1953) (“Perhaps a plaintiff does have to take 
what Congress gives him or doesn’t give him [by way of jurisdiction] . . . . But surely not a 
defendant. It’s only a limitation on what a court can do once it has jurisdiction, not a denial of 
jurisdiction, that can hurt a defendant. And if the court thinks the limitation is invalid, it’s always 
in a position to say so, and either to ignore it or let the defendant go free.”). 
169 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (citation omitted); see also 
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983) (“[W]hen an individual who is the very object of a law’s 
requirement or prohibition seeks to challenge it, he always has standing.”).  
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the government in bringing its action. 171F170 There is no need to demonstrate a 
cause of action, since the defendant is acting defensively.  
The government might argue that raising constitutional defenses is  
implicitly precluded by statute. Specifically, by limiting review to whether 
the Secretary’s two determinations are arbitrary and capricious, the Dodd–
Frank Act implicitly precludes consideration of other issues. Given the 
established canon that implied preclusion of review of constitutional 
questions is disfavored, however, it is difficult to see how this would succeed. 
It is well established that Congress must speak with clarity before it cuts off 
constitutional claims, and the Court has said a “serious constitutional ques-
tion” would be presented if such a clear statement of preclusion were ever 
encountered. 172F171 Nothing in Title II comes close to a clear statement preclud-
ing constitutional defenses. 173F172 Thus, if and when the Secretary of the 
Treasury files a petition in the District Court for the District of Columbia 
asking for the appointment of a receiver to liquidate a financial firm, the 
firm (and possibly its officers or directors) can raise constitutional defenses 
in response to the petition.  
The peculiar procedures set forth in Title II greatly complicate this  
conventional approach. One problem is notice. Some stakeholders—namely, 
the directors and principal officers of the firm targeted for receivership and 
liquidation—will know about the Secretary’s petition. But other stakeholders—
including creditors, counterparties, most employees of the firm, and the 
shareholders of the firm—cannot raise constitutional objections defensively, 
because Dodd–Frank makes no provision for giving them notice, requires 
that the court proceedings be conducted “on a strictly confidential basis,” 174F173 
and indeed makes it a criminal offense for anyone who is aware of the 
proceeding to give notice to any third party. 175F174 If there is no legal way to 
obtain notice of adverse action by the government, one cannot defend 
 
170 See 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2012) (providing the district courts with original jurisdiction in “all 
civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer 
thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress”).  
171 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 
(1974) (holding that there must be clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent in order 
for a statute to permissibly restrict access to judicial review). 
172 Various provisions of the Act address questions of judicial review, but these provisions all 
cut off judicial proceedings asserting most claims against the firm while it is in receivership or 
most actions against the FDIC in its capacity as receiver. Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(9)(D), 12 
U.S.C. § 5390(a)(9)(D) (2012). These provisions do not address review of the Secretary’s decision 
to seek appointment of a receiver nor do they address possible constitutional challenges to the Act 
or any of its provisions. 
173 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
174 Id. § 202(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C). 
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against it on constitutional or any other grounds. It is equally problematic 
that the district court cannot conceivably give adequate consideration to a 
constitutional defense in only twenty-four hours. The Secretary will insist 
that the statute requires adhering to the twenty-four-hour deadline, at 
which point the petition is deemed automatically granted and no stay is 
possible. 176F175 Further, the Secretary would likely claim that urgent action is 
necessary to avert financial crisis. Faced with a conflict between a strict 
statutory deadline and government warnings of financial crisis, on the one 
hand, and the court’s duty to enforce the Constitution, on the other, what is 
the court going to do?  
The court could resolve the conflict by invoking the Constitution as  
authority to make modest modifications to the statutory procedures. 177F176 For 
example, the court might grant a temporary stay of further action on the 
petition to afford an adequate period of time to brief and consider the 
constitutional issues presented. After all, at this point the proceedings are 
confidential and the papers have been filed under seal. 178F177 If the court is 
persuaded that the constitutional defenses are serious, it might grant a short 
stay, perhaps of a few days, to give the issues full consideration. If, after this 
period of expedited consideration, the court concludes that the statute is 
unconstitutional in one or more respects, it could order permanent injunctive 
relief that cures the constitutional defect and allows the court to consider 
the petition in a manner consistent with constitutional requirements. 179F178 
This constitutional ruling would, of course, be subject to appeal by the 
government (which could request a stay or emergency relief ) under the 
ordinary rules of appellate procedure.  
This solution is problematic, however, because it requires the court  
to effectively rewrite the statute before deciding its constitutionality. This 
 
175 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(v), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v).  
176 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258-60 (2005) (removing two provisions from 
the Federal Sentencing Act that made the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory and hence 
unconstitutional rather than invalidating the legislation in its entirety); see also United States v. 
Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1198-1202 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (requiring post-indictment hearing 
procedures for any finding of probable cause in connection with a restraint on pretrial disposition 
of assets); Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1976) (declaring a federal provision 
allowing for seizure of vehicles for customs violations unconstitutional for lack of procedural due 
process and remedying the infirmity by requiring action on petitions for mitigation or remission 
within twenty-four hours and a probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours). 
177 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii). 
178 An issue of severability would be presented, at least implicitly. But it seems unlikely that 
the entire Dodd–Frank Act should fall on constitutional grounds due to a few constitutional 
infirmities in the process for appointing a receiver. 
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fix also does nothing to provide notice to other stakeholders who may wish 
to raise constitutional objections. 
B. Enjoining the Receiver 
A second possible approach is for any stakeholder aggrieved by the  
appointment of a receiver and pending liquidation of the firm to file an 
independent action in the district court seeking to enjoin the receivership 
on constitutional grounds. Jurisdiction would be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
which applies to actions grounded in the Constitution. 180F179 Standing would be 
established by the prospective liquidation of the firm, loss of rights, or loss 
of claims having monetary value. 181F180 The cause of action could be based on 
the APA, which provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute 
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court 
are subject to judicial review.” 182F181 The Secretary’s decision to petition for a 
receivership would be considered final agency action, and Dodd–Frank’s 
draconian twenty-four-hour time limit and requirement that judicial 
proceedings remain in camera would preclude the Act from affording “an 
adequate remedy in court.” 183F182 The virtue of this approach is that the suit 
would be filed immediately after establishing the receivership, so the 
automatic stay powers given to the receiver would be in effect, temporarily 
stabilizing the situation and hopefully forestalling financial panic analogous 
to a run on the bank.  
Unfortunately, Dodd–Frank appears to eliminate this option, at least for 
some constitutional claims: “Except as provided in this title, no court may 
take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of 
the receiver hereunder, and any remedy against the Corporation or receiver 
shall be limited to money damages determined in accordance with this 
title.” 184F183 This provision seems to preclude any action to “restrain or affect” 
the receiver based on constitutional claims in an action brought under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.185F184 Thus, for example, no court could entertain an action to 
 
179 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (providing that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution”).  
180 Any claimant who is “likely to suffer economic injury as a result of an agency action  
satisfies” the requirement of injury in fact. 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 16.4, at 1416 (5th ed. 2010).  
181 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
182 Id. 
183 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(e), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(e) (2012). 
184 Id. The courts of appeals have interpreted other financial statutes with nearly identical 
wording as precluding claims based on the APA or violations of federal statutory law. See, e.g., 
Cnty. of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 710 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the 
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enjoin the receiver on the ground that the statute violates the uniformity 
requirement of the Bankruptcy Power or the just compensation requirement 
of the Takings Clause. This preclusion of review, however, might not apply 
to constitutional claims—including those based on Article III, the First 
Amendment, or due process—concerning the initial proceeding in the 
district court to appoint a receiver. Such claims challenge the judicial 
process to appoint the receiver and so do not seek to “restrain or affect” the 
powers of the receiver once appointed.186F185  
C. Suit for Anticipatory Relief 
The third option is to file an action challenging the constitutionality of 
the Act before the Secretary files a petition to appoint a receiver. Here, 
standing likely would be the most serious problem, particularly if the firm 
or the stakeholder bringing the action cannot demonstrate that action by the 
government is threatened or “certainly impending.” 187F186 It would likely be 
 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which substantially limits judicial review of the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency’s actions as conservator, barred the court from taking jurisdic-
tion over the plaintiffs’ claims, so long as the directive being challenged was a lawful exercise of 
the Agency’s power as conservator); Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221, 
227-28 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a statute that empowers the Federal Housing Finance Agency, 
as conservator for the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), to take necessary actions to put those 
regulated entities in sound and solvent condition and which limits judicial review of the Agency’s 
exercise of actions as conservator, did not authorize judicial review of FHFA’s issuance of a 
directive that caused Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to stop purchasing mortgages secured by 
properties subject to priority lien obligations under local governments’ first-lien Property Assessed 
Clean Energy programs); Freeman v. FDIC, 56 F.3d 1394, 1399-1400 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding 
that a provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act prohibited 
the court from restraining the powers of the FDIC and thus the court could not grant relief to 
prevent the FDIC from foreclosing on plaintiffs–debtors’ residences, which served as collateral for 
notes held by a failed bank for which the FDIC was receiver). The only apparent exception, 
recognized in dicta, is if the agency acts “beyond, or contrary to, its statutorily prescribed, 
constitutionally permitted, powers or functions.” Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres. v. FDIC, 995 F.2d 
238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Sharpe v. FDIC, 126 F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997).  
185 As for defects in the appointment process, one might also file a motion under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to set aside the final judgment approving the receiver on the ground 
that the judgment was obtained under procedures that violate the Constitution. FED. R. CIV. P. 
60(b). The Rule 60(b) motion would not be governed by Dodd–Frank’s time limits or gag order 
and hence would not encounter the problems that doom any constitutional defense raised in 
response to the petition itself. Still, even if a Rule 60(b) motion works for claims directed to the 
judicial process for appointing a receiver, it would not work for other constitutional objections to 
Title II. 
186 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (citation omitted). In the case 
of the stakeholders, standing may be even more difficult to establish. See Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (“[W]hen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government 
 
  
2014] Dodd–Frank: Too Big for the Constitution? 199 
 
necessary to demonstrate that the government is seriously contemplating 
using the OLA to appoint a receiver, but such a showing will be difficult if 
the government is successful in keeping its internal deliberations secret.  
Do the state attorneys general in the Big Spring litigation stand on firmer 
footing in mounting a challenge to Title II before it has been applied to any 
particular firm? Arguably, they do. Although the Supreme Court has 
rejected state standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal legisla-
tion on behalf of its citizens through parens patriae suits,188F187 recent decisions 
suggest growing liberality toward state standing. For example, in  
Massachusetts v. EPA, where Massachusetts sought to challenge the federal 
government’s failure to regulate global warming, the Supreme Court, in 
determining the State’s standing to sue, spoke mysteriously about states 
enjoying “special solicitude” relative to private parties. 189F188 More recently, in 
the Affordable Care Act litigation, serious questions were raised about state 
standing, with the Fourth Circuit ruling that Virginia lacked standing to 
challenge the individual mandate. 190F189 The Supreme Court declined to review 
this ruling 191F190 and, in a separate case, went on to consider a wide-ranging 
challenge to the individual mandate brought by twenty-six States, as well as 
several other plaintiffs, without uttering a word about the States’ standing.192F191 
This, of course, does not mean the Court found that the States had standing. 
There were other plaintiffs in the case, including private individuals, and 
the Court may have implicitly concluded these individuals had standing to 
challenge the mandate. Nevertheless, the Affordable Care Act case may lend 
further support to the idea that state standing is to be liberally construed. 
The attorneys general lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Title 
II of Dodd–Frank rests on the States’ interest in their employee pension 
funds, which include investments in firms that are potentially eligible for 
liquidation under Title II. 193F192 Although none of these firms is currently 
threatened with orderly resolution under Dodd–Frank, the States argue that 
the Act has taken away their federal statutory right to have their interests as 
 
action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more 
difficult’ to establish.” (citation omitted)). 
187 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) (finding that a state cannot 
institute judicial proceedings as parens patriae to protect its citizens, who are also citizens of the 
United States, from the operation of a federal statute, because the federal government, not the 
state, represents those citizens as parens patriae). 
188 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). 
189 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011). 
190 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 59 (2012) (denying petition for writ of 
certiorari).  
191 See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
192 See generally Big Spring Second Amended Complaint, supra note 27. 
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creditors treated the same as other similarly situated creditors. 194F193 They 
claim that the abrogation of their rights is a present invasion of a legally 
protected interest and hence satisfies the Article III requirement of actual 
immediate injury. 195F194 The right to equal treatment of creditors under the 
Bankruptcy Code, however, is one that comes into play only when a debtor 
is bankrupt. If the mere existence of a debt were enough to confer standing 
to challenge a change in the legal treatment of creditors, then any person 
would be able to challenge any change in the law that might conceivably 
affect their interests as creditors sometime in the future. This is clearly not 
the law. 196F195 Also, an injury caused by Dodd–Frank’s authorization of depar-
tures from equal treatment of similarly situated creditors bears no causal 
relationship to Article III, First Amendment, or due process objections to 
the Act. 197F196 Thus, it is not clear that this alleged injury, even if otherwise 
sufficient to confer standing, would support standing to challenge the OLA’s 
constitutionality prior to the actual commencement of an OLA receivership. 
Therefore, we are inclined to agree with the District Court that the States’ 
suit is premature, 198F197 and we anticipate that the D.C. Circuit will agree as 
well, at least in the absence of further evidence that a particular invocation 
of the OLA would affect the States’ financial interests.  
Finding a cause of action could also be problematic. The APA, to repeat, 
provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to 
judicial review.” 199F198 If the Secretary of the Treasury has not yet made a 
determination to file a petition, it would be difficult to claim that there is a 
final agency action to review. Absent a cause of action under the APA, the 
cause of action would have to be implied directly from the Constitution. 
 
193 State Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the  
Second Amended Complaint at 16-19, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127 
(D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-1032).  
194 Id. at 19-24. 
195 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009) (noting that allegations 
that an injury may occur “some day” without “any specification of when that some day will be” do 
not satisfy the imminent injury requirement for standing (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1992) (stating that a plaintiff does 
not state an Article III case or controversy when he “rais[es] only a generally available grievance 
about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of 
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than 
it does the public at large”). 
196 It is not clear that this provision of Dodd–Frank even implicates the uniformity require-
ment of the Bankruptcy Clause if it is interpreted to require that debtors be treated uniformly, as 
opposed to creditors. See infra Section IV.A. 
197 State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127, 141-46 (D.D.C. 2013).  
198 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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Specifically, it would be necessary to bring an Ex parte Young–style action 
seeking to enjoin federal officers, including the Secretary of the Treasury, 
from threatening action alleged to violate the Constitution. 200F199 Although 
there is controversy about the rationale and scope of actions based on Ex 
parte Young, 201F200 the decision is firmly established in federal jurisprudence as a 
means of securing equitable relief for violations of the Constitution, and 
presumably it remains a valid fallback when the APA does not apply.202F201 
If the standing obstacle can be overcome, an Ex parte Young–style action 
might be the best of the three options. The action would not be subject to 
Dodd–Frank’s time limits or notice prohibitions, which only come into play 
after the petition is filed. Nor would the action be limited by the preclusion 
of actions that seek to “restrain or affect” the powers of the receiver, because 
the receiver would not have been appointed.  
D. The Tucker Act Defense 
Whichever option is chosen, the government would likely seek to defeat 
any request for injunctive or declaratory relief on the ground that the firm 
and its stakeholders will suffer no irreparable injury if the constitutional 
arguments are postponed until after the OLA process is complete. A likely 
doctrinal vehicle for advancing this defense would be the Tucker Act 203F202 and 
the accompanying proposition that takings claims should not be adjudicated 
by a court of general jurisdiction, provided that all the interests at stake can 
be fully protected by a suit for just compensation in the Court of Federal 
Claims under the Tucker Act. 204F203 Dodd–Frank contains language that cuts 
 
199 See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing suits for prospective injunctive 
relief against officials acting on behalf of a state government to proceed in the federal courts, 
despite the state’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, when those state officials 
act unconstitutionally).  
200  See David L. Shapiro, Ex Parte Young and the Uses of History, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 69, 70 (2011) (remarking that “the range of justifications for the result [in Ex parte Young], and 
the analyses of its implications, are almost as diverse as the ethnic makeup of a typical subway car 
on a New York City 1 train”). 
201 See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (reaffirming that, 
under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, “a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into 
whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly 
characterized as prospective’” (citation omitted)).  
202 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012) (providing that “[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims 
shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either 
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon 
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages 
in cases not sounding in tort”).  
203 See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 13 (1990) (finding that “the 
Tucker Act is an ‘implie[d] promis[e]’ to pay just compensation which individual laws need not 
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off any remedy against the FDIC as receiver, except an action for money 
damages as authorized by Title II. 205F204 But the Tucker Act authorizes suits 
against the United States for takings or breach of contract, and Dodd–Frank 
does not specifically disclaim such a remedy.  
Whether such a “no irreparable harm” argument would succeed is  
uncertain. The Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the Tucker 
Act is that the Act’s remedy is not exclusive and may be displaced entirely if 
another applicable statute supplies a “comprehensive remedial scheme.” 206F205 
Dodd–Frank certainly seems to fit this description. Thus maybe even a 
takings claim could be raised in an anticipatory challenge to the constitu-
tionality of Dodd–Frank’s Title II, at least by way of declaratory judgment. 
If the court finds that the receivership resulted in a taking, then the  
aggrieved party could bring a suit for just compensation in the Court of 
Federal Claims.207F206  
The government would likely seek to bolster its “no irreparable harm” 
argument by claiming that the interests at stake are exclusively monetary 
claims and that such interests, by their very nature, can be vindicated by ex 
post monetary awards with interest to reflect the time value of money. 
Creditors who claim their security interests have been violated, officers who 
claim their salaries have been wrongfully clawed back, directors who claim 
to be unfairly deprived of their paid positions—all of these aggrieved 
persons can be made whole by an award of money damages. Unlawful 
actions that can be rectified by such damages are generally not regarded as 
presenting the kind of irreparable harm justifying injunctive relief.208F207  
 
reiterate” (citation omitted)); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018-19 (1984) (finding 
that an action under the Tucker Act remained available as a remedy for any uncompensated taking 
that an applicant for registration of the pesticide might suffer as a result of the operation of the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act’s data consideration and disclosure provisions). 
For application of the principle in the bankruptcy context, see Regional Rail Reorganization Act 
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126-27 (1974), which viewed the Tucker Act remedy as covering any shortfall 
between the remedy provided by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act and just compensation. 
204 See Dodd–Frank Act § 210(e), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(e) (2012) (providing that “any remedy 
against the corporation or receiver shall be limited to money damages determined in accordance 
with this title”); see also id. § 210(a)(8)(D), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(8)(D) (“Except as otherwise 
provided in this title, no court shall have jurisdiction over . . . any claim relating to any act or 
omission of . . . the Corporation as receiver.”). By and large, any claims against the FDIC will by 
brought by creditors and others with various rights stemming from their pre-receivership 
relationship with a covered financial company that were extinguished or modified by FDIC 
receivership under the OLA. 
205 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2013).  
206 Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015) (manuscript at 30) (on file with authors). 
207 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“According to 
well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction . . . must 
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If the only constitutional questions presented were takings and  
impairment of contract claims and the government’s authority was otherwise 
uncontested, this argument would be well founded. But if the government’s 
authority to proceed in the manner directed by the statute is challenged on 
other constitutional grounds, an ex post award of damages would not be a 
sufficient remedy.209F208 The Due Process Clause says that no one shall be 
deprived of property without due process of law. 210F209 This generally means, at 
least where conventional property interests are at stake, that a person must 
be given an opportunity to challenge the legal authority of the government 
before his or her property is taken. 211F210 Thus, if a firm makes a credible 
contention that government is seeking its liquidation in a manner contrary 
to law, this issue should be resolved before the government liquidates the 
firm. Once the firm’s assets are sold off and it is liquidated, the firm cannot 
be put back together again. Claims based on Article III of the Constitution, 
on the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement, or on the First 
Amendment would also seem to be the sort of claims that cannot be rectified 
by ex post damages awards. At least as to these constitutional claims, the 
firm facing liquidation will suffer irreparable harm if the inquiry is postponed 
until after the firm is fully dissolved. 
 
demonstrate[, among other things,] . . . that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury . . . .” (citation omitted)); Amoco Prod. Co. v. 
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) (“In brief, the bases for injunctive relief are irreparable injury 
and the inadequacy of legal remedies.”); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) 
(“The Court has repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always 
been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.” (citation omitted)). 
208 Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 707-08 
(1990) (noting that injunctions are the standard remedy in cases asserting violations of constitu-
tional rights). Even takings claims are subject to this limiting principle. The Takings Clause has 
been interpreted to mean that the government can take property only for a public use. See Kelo v. 
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477-78 (2005) (differentiating between permitted takings for 
public use and prohibited takings for purely private benefit). If a property owner contends the 
taking is not for a public use, the owner’s claim must be resolved before the taking occurs, not 
after. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (citing of cases supporting the 
proposition that property cannot be taken “‘without a justifying public purpose, even though 
compensation be paid,’” implying that this is a threshold issue requiring resolution at the outset 
(citations omitted)). If the court postpones considering the issue, and the taking is later deter-
mined not to be for a public use, there will be no way to correct the constitutional violation. An 
award of just compensation simply cannot remedy a constitutional right that property not be taken 
in the first place. Note that we are not suggesting a firm could mount a successful public use 
argument against a Dodd–Frank receivership. The point is more general.  
209 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
210 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1991) (holding that a Connecticut statute 
authorizing prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing and without 
requiring a showing of exigent circumstances did not satisfy due process requirements). 
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: PROCESS OBJECTIONS 
The prospect of the appointment of the FDIC to liquidate a firm under 
Title II would likely spark deep anxiety in a variety of the targeted firm’s 
stakeholders. Creditors would worry that they will not get any of their 
money back or that they will get only liquidation value, as opposed to the 
potentially greater “going concern” value available through reorganization. 
Officers and directors would worry that they will be out of a job or, worse, 
that they will be held personally liable for the failure of the firm. 212F211 Share-
holders would be concerned by the prospect of having their investments 
wiped out. Each of these groups would have an incentive to bolster its 
position by raising constitutional objections to the OLA process. Arguments 
conceivably could be advanced under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, Article III of the Constitution, the Uniformity Clause of the 
Bankruptcy Power, the First Amendment, and the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. In this Part, we consider the various process objections 
that could be brought in under the Due Process Clause and Article III. 
A. Due Process 
In order to establish a due process violation, a claimant must show that 
he or she has a life, liberty, or property interest; that the government is 
threatening to deprive him or her of that interest; and that the deprivation 
will take place without affording him or her adequate notice or opportunity 
to be heard.213F212 
We assume that all relevant parties who might feel threatened by the 
prospect of a Title II liquidation would satisfy the threshold requirement of 
having a “property” interest at stake. For purposes of due process, property 
includes money and securities; thus, creditors of all stripes have constitu-
tionally protected property interests in the assets of a debtor firm.214F213 
 
211 Dodd–Frank Act § 204(a)(2)-(3), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a)(2)-(3) (2012) (establishing that management 
deemed by the FDIC to be responsible for the failing of the financial firm must be terminated 
and, perhaps more significantly, that “all parties, including management, directors, and third 
parties, having responsibility for the condition of the financial company bear losses consistent with 
their responsibility, including actions for damages, restitution, and recoupment of compensation 
and other gains not compatible with such responsibility”). Given that the Title II regulations 
promulgated by the FDIC establish a presumption that the failed financial firm’s chairman, CEO, 
president, CFO, and other similarly situated management personnel are “substantially responsible 
for the failed condition” of the company, there is a good chance that such persons would incur some 
type of personal liability or monetary penalty. 12 C.F.R. § 380.7(b)(1)(i).  
212 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
213 See Tulsa Prof ’l Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (holding that an 
unsecured creditor’s claim is “property” for purposes of procedural due process). 
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Property also includes gainful employment, at least if the employee has an 
unexpired employment contract that makes him or her more than an at will 
employee.215F214 Consequently, officers and directors who will lose their positions 
through an exercise of the OLA have a property interest under the Due 
Process Clause, provided they are working under an unexpired employment 
contract. It is also undeniable that the actions taken by the FDIC in  
completing an orderly liquidation would constitute action that would 
deprive these parties of their respective interests.  
In assessing what process is due, the Supreme Court has tended to treat 
notice as a requirement distinct from other procedural elements. 216F215 Notice 
by mail or a similarly effective method is generally required for any proceeding 
that will adversely affect the property rights of an affected party as long as 
their name and address are “reasonably ascertainable.” 217F216 The notice  
requirement calls into question the constitutionality of the Act’s criminal 
penalties for providing notice to anyone other than the firm possibly facing 
receivership. 218F217 Shareholders, counterparties, creditors, and officers deemed 
to be responsible for the financial distress of the firm may have their 
interests compromised or completely wiped out by mandatory liquidation 
under Title II, and yet the statute makes it a criminal offense to provide 
them with the notice that would allow them to voice their objections before 
liquidation commences.  
In response, the government would undoubtedly point to bank receiverships, 
where traditionally no formal notice is given before a receiver is appointed 
 
214 See FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988) (finding that “appellee’s interest in the 
right to continue to serve as president of the bank and to participate in the conduct of its affairs is 
a property right protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause”); Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985) (finding that, absent a valid cause for termination, 
civil service employment is a property interest under applicable state law and thus subject to due 
process protection). 
215 See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006) (“Before a State may take property[,] . . . the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner 
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a 
century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose rights are to 
be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be 
notified.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
216 See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (“Notice by mail or 
other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a 
proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interest of any party.”); Mullane v. 
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 
and to afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” (citations omitted)). 
217 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
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and property seized. 219F218 In practice, however, the appointment of a receiver 
will typically come as no surprise to the bank and its officers and directors. 
As the D.C. Circuit has observed, bank regulators ordinarily raise concerns 
about the adequacy of the bank’s reserves or other financial issues with bank 
officers over an extended period of time before initiating receivership 
procedures, giving the bank an idea of the relevant issues and an opportunity 
to respond, albeit informally. 220F219 Whether nonbank financial firms will 
similarly be alerted to the possibility of seizure under Title II through 
informal communications with regulators is unclear; certainly, the statute 
does not require it. Further, even if the firm has been given effective notice, 
notice cannot legally be given to creditors and other stakeholders.  
The government would inevitably fall back on the position that exigent 
circumstances, such as public health emergencies, sometimes require it to 
act without giving advance notice. The government would argue that 
advance notice to all reasonably ascertainable stakeholders cannot be given 
before seizing the firm pursuant to the OLA, because such notice could 
trigger the very financial panic or instability Dodd–Frank was designed to 
prevent. Such arguments have been accepted in other emergency contexts, 
but almost invariably with the caveat that a prompt post-deprivation 
hearing is made available, during which the legality of the seizure may be 
challenged and the property restored to its rightful owner if the seizure 
turns out to have been unwarranted. 221F220 Justice Jackson, in Fahey v. Mallonee, 
described bank seizure as a “drastic procedure” justified by “the delicate 
nature of the institution and the impossibility of preserving credit during an 
investigation.” 222F221 But the procedure at issue there 223F222 provided for extensive 
 
218 See David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 119 (2010) (noting that twenty-
one banks were closed in 2009 “without any prior notice by the agency”). 
219 James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099-1101 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that the 
numerous opportunities for both the bank and its officers to respond to bank examiners’ findings 
served as adequate replacement for a formal pre-seizure hearing). 
220 See, e.g., FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240-41 (1988) (finding that the public interest in 
an orderly liquidation of the seized bank necessitated holding the hearing after the seizure had 
already occurred); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947) (permitting seizure of a bank 
prior to a hearing in light of the risks to the bank’s assets and operations posed by delay and public 
awareness of an investigation into the bank); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 30 (1928) 
(holding that deprivation prior to formal proceedings is permissible, provided that some means to 
challenge the deprivation is provided before it becomes final); N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. 
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315-21 (1908) (allowing seizure and destruction of tainted food prior to a 
hearing due to public health dangers, provided that a post-seizure hearing must be permitted). 
221 Fahey, 332 U.S. at 253. 
222 The procedure being challenged in Fahey was set forth in section 5(d) of the Home Owners’ 
Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, § 5(d), 48 Stat. 128, 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§1464(d) (2012)). This provision gave the Board of the Federal Home Loan Administration the 
authority to reorganize, consolidate, merge, or liquidate federal savings and loan associations, 
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hearing rights, including a full particularization of the reasons for the 
seizure, within a matter of days after the seizure. 224F223 Dodd–Frank’s OLA, as 
amended by the Senate, eliminates the right to post-seizure judicial review 
routinely available (even if rarely invoked) in the banking industry. Under 
Dodd–Frank, creditors who dispute the FDIC’s determination of the 
priority or the valuation of their individual claims can seek judicial review.225F224 
But the government could point to no provision in the statute that provides 
a post-seizure remedy to any other stakeholder, including creditors who 
believe they would obtain more for their claims in a reorganization in 
bankruptcy, making it much more difficult to justify the absence of notice to 
these affected persons or institutions.  
Beyond notice, the extremely abbreviated twenty-four-hour period  
required by Title II between the filing of the petition and the automatic 
grant of the petition also presents due process concerns. Realistically, it is 
hard to imagine that this is adequate time for the firm to mount an effective 
defense or for the court to engage in meaningful deliberation. 226F225 To be sure, 
the only issues the court may consider are whether the Secretary acted in an 
arbitrary and capricious fashion in determining that the firm is a “financial 
company,” as defined by the statute, 227F226 and that the firm is in default or in 
danger of default. 228F227 But if these elements are contested, it is inconceivable 
that the firm could put together and present to the court a coherent rebuttal 
and that the court could digest the issues and render a well-considered 
 
including the power to appoint a conservator or a receiver to take charge of the affairs of any 
association. Id.  
223 Fahey, 332 U.S. at 252-53.  
224 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(4) (2012). 
225 See Kenneth Scott, Dodd Frank: Resolution or Expropriation (Feb. 29, 2012) (Stanford 
Law Sch.), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1673849 (“The Dodd–
Frank Act squeezes pre-seizure due process down to the vanishing point.”).  
226 Dodd–Frank Act § 201(11), 12 U.S.C. § 5381(11). The section defines “financial company” 
as a bank holding company, nonbank financial company supervised by the Federal Reserve Board, 
or any company or subsidiary of a company previously determined by the Federal Reserve to be 
predominately engaged in activities “financial in nature.” Id. For a more comprehensive overview 
of what constitutes a financial company for the purposes of Title II, see supra note 134.  
227 The standard for determining whether a financial firm is in default or in danger of default 
is defined by Dodd–Frank Act § 203(c)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(c)(4), which sets forth four alternative 
conditions for such a finding. Some of these conditions, such as that a bankruptcy case is likely to 
be promptly commenced, id. § 203(c)(4)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(c)(4)(A), might be proven by 
documentary or testimonial evidence, and could conceivably be resolved in one day, provided the 
evidence was already in hand. But other conditions, such as that the firm “has incurred, or is likely 
to incur, losses that will deplete all or substantially all of its capital, and there is no reasonable 
prospect for the company to avoid such depletion,” id. § 203(c)(4)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(c)(4)(B), 
would seem to require complex expert witness testimony that would be impossible to rebut or sort 
out in twenty-four hours. 
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decision within the extremely compressed time period. The impracticality 
of the deadline would be particularly apparent in any review of the FDIC’s 
finding that the firm is in default or in danger of default, which could entail 
examining hundreds of disputed accounting issues, many of great complexity. 
The judicial review process is made even more problematic by the lack 
of guidance on the intended meaning of Dodd–Frank’s “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard of review. 229F228 While the APA directs courts to set aside 
agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law,” 230F229 a standard which expressly encompasses 
questions of law as well as fact, Dodd–Frank uses only the term “arbitrary 
and capricious.”231F230 Does Dodd–Frank’s omission of the phrase “otherwise 
not in accordance with law” mean that the district court may not review 
disputed questions of law? Such a construction would very likely be uncon-
stitutional. 232F231 The fundamental objective of the Due Process Clause is to 
assure that the government deprives persons of their property only in 
accordance with the law, that is, with “due process of law.” 233F232 An attempt by 
Congress to cut off any ability to challenge the lawfulness of a taking of 
property—at both the administrative and the judicial level—would almost 
certainly contravene due process. 
The statute’s limitation of judicial review to just two of the seven factors 
that the Secretary of the Treasury must consider in determining whether to 
petition for appointment of a receiver creates further due process problems. 
Dodd–Frank requires the Secretary to petition for a receivership if he 
makes seven enumerated determinations listed in the statute. 234F233 However, 
there is no provision for an administrative hearing to review any of the 
seven determinations, and only two of the seven are subject to judicial 
scrutiny, which must occur in the previously described twenty-four-hour 
hearing pursuant to the rather ambiguous “arbitrary and capricious” standard 
of review. 235F234 How can the government seize and liquidate a major financial 
firm based on five determinations that are never subject to any administrative 
 
228 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II). 
229 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
230 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I)-(II). 
231 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932) (“In cases brought to enforce constitutional 
rights, the judicial power of the United States necessarily extends to the independent determination 
of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to the performance of that supreme function.”); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 915, 943-49 (1988) (discussing the importance of independent determinations of law by 
Article III courts). 
232 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
233 Dodd–Frank Act § 203(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b) (2012). 
234 Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
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or judicial review? Ordinarily, persons may not be deprived of property by 
administrative action that is immune from all review by the courts. 236F235 Why, 
then, can financial firms be liquidated without any opportunity to contest 
the legal determinations that support this action?  
Admittedly, some determinations required by Dodd–Frank involve  
discretionary judgments best left to an agency’s expertise, such as the 
finding that resolution of the firm under ordinary bankruptcy law “would 
have serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States.” 237F236 
But others are highly factual, such as the finding that the financial firm has 
been ordered “to convert all convertible debt instruments.” 238F237 Eliminating 
all avenues of challenging this latter type of factual determination, either 
through ex ante or ex post review, is hard to justify as consistent with due 
process. 
Is it possible to defend the extremely limited judicial review provided by 
Title II based on the government’s paramount interest in preventing 
financial meltdown? The general due process standard for procedural 
adequacy is the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, which focuses on three 
factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” 
(2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” 239F238 The magnitude of 
the private interest at stake will depend on who is bringing the challenge. 
The firm, its directors and officers, and its shareholders may have the 
greatest interests. First, the statute mandates that any firm placed in an 
OLA receivership must be liquidated and that all shareholder equity must 
be wiped out before other creditors take a hit. 240F239 Second, all responsible 
directors are presumptively subject to dismissal. 241F240 Directors of systemically 
significant financial firms may not elicit as much sympathy from the courts 
 
235 See, e.g., Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 456-57 (1890) 
(holding that a statute giving a regulatory commission authority to prescribe rates without any 
possibility of judicial review violated due process). 
236 Dodd–Frank Act § 203(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2) (2012). 
237 Id. § 203(b)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(6). 
238  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
239 See Dodd–Frank Act § 206(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(2) (mandating that shareholders “of a 
covered financial company do not receive payment until after all other claims and the Fund are 
fully paid”).  
240 See supra note 211. 
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as school janitors or welfare recipients, 242F241 but directorships are paid  
positions and, under the statute, the appointment of receiver is the critical 
decision that determines whether a director keeps or loses her position. 
Once a receiver is appointed, directors will invariably be terminated.243F242 
Third, creditors will have more difficulty arguing that their interests are 
significant. Although Title II gives creditors the right to bring a judicial 
proceeding to determine the validity of their claims, it limits a creditor’s 
compensation to the amount that the claimant would receive in a liquidation 
of the firm. 244F243 Finally, officers who fear dismissal may be met with the 
argument that consideration of this prospect at the time of appointment of a 
receiver is premature. Dismissal of an officer is required only if that person 
is found “responsible for the failed condition of the covered financial 
company.” 245F244 Thus, any challenge by officers may not be ripe until the 
FDIC determines those officers warrant dismissal.  
The government will undoubtedly argue that the procedures prescribed 
by Title II serve public interests of the highest magnitude. Dodd–Frank’s 
limited notice and rocket-like hearing requirements are designed to prevent 
a financial panic analogous to a run on the bank, which could occur if 
ordinary judicial procedures were followed. In order to prevent future 
financial crises caused by the collapse of a too big to fail nonbank financial 
firm, Congress determined that the government must be able to seize and 
liquidate the firm in an expeditious, in camera process. Stated in these 
terms, it is difficult to see how the interests of a single firm or its shareholders 
and directors and officers in avoiding liquidation outweigh the prevention of 
 
241 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (ruling that a school 
janitor with an undisclosed criminal record was entitled to a hearing before termination given the 
importance of employment to an individual’s welfare); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) 
(holding that welfare recipients are entitled to an adjudicatory hearing before termination of their 
benefits given the “brutal need” eligible recipients have for such funds). 
242 See Dodd–Frank Act § 206(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(5) (requiring removal of the directors 
“responsible for the failed condition” of the company). 
243 Id. § 210(a)(7)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(7)(B); id. § 210(d)(2)-(3), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(d)(2)-(3). 
The confusing language used in these sections appears to establish liquidation value as both a 
ceiling and a floor. Section 210(a)(7)(B) speaks to what a creditor, at minimum, must receive, 
specifically providing that “[a] creditor shall, in no event, receive less than the amount that the 
creditor is entitled to receive under paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (d), as applicable.” Id. 
§ 210(a)(7)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(7)(B). However, section 210(d)(2) does not actually address the 
issue of a creditor’s minimum recovery. Id. § 210(d)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(d)(2). Instead, it speaks 
to the “maximum liability of the Corporation,” explicitly limiting the amount that the FDIC, as 
receiver, will have to pay out to any creditor of the financial firm to what the creditor would have 
received if the firm was liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.  
244 Id. § 206(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5386(4). 
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an economic crisis. If forced to choose between patent unfairness and 
economic disaster, courts will likely acquiesce in patent unfairness. 
Notice, however, that the Mathews v. Eldridge test appears to contemplate 
a marginalist inquiry. The test’s primary question is not whether the totality 
of private interests outweighs the totality of governmental interests but 
whether “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” would be worth 
more or less than the “fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 246F245 In the context of an 
OLA petition, the Mathews standard implies, for example, that the court 
should ask whether affording a financial firm, say, an additional twenty-four 
hours to mount a defense (with the proceedings remaining under seal) is 
worth more in terms of preventing unfairness than the costs of increasing 
the risk of financial disaster. There is, of course, no definitive answer to 
such a question, which highlights a key problem associated with Mathews’s 
risk–utility test more generally.247F246 However, posing the question in this way 
would at least increase the odds that a court would agree that Dodd–Frank 
violates due process in that at least some additional procedures in the 
expedited process would be worth more than the administrative burdens 
those procedures would create. 
Given the intractable nature of the Mathews balancing test, especially as 
applied to such a high-stakes situation as a looming financial crisis, it is 
virtually certain that the parties and the court would look to similar processes 
in other contexts in order to decide whether Title II comports with due 
process. In particular, the government would inevitably emphasize that 
existing bank receivership laws allow regulators to seize banking companies 
with no advance judicial process at all.248F247  
The problem with this analogy is twofold. First, as emphasized above, 
the banking receivership statutes provide for judicial review after the seizure 
takes place. 249F248 Both the Administration’s Combined Draft and the House 
bill followed this model, providing for judicial review after the seizure of a 
systemically significant nonbank financial firm, without restriction as to the 
 
245 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
246 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1423, 1429-30 (1980–1981) (describing objections to the Mathews balancing test). 
247 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority 
Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 
64173, 64178 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) (emphasizing that the 
proposed rule’s treatment of long-term unsecured senior debt is consistent with existing treatment 
of such debt in FDIC bank receivership regulations).  
248 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(7) (2012); see also supra text accompanying notes 65-67.  
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issues presented or the time the court takes to reach a decision. 250F249 The 
Senate, however, eliminated post-seizure review and substituted an  
extremely limited, one-day pre-seizure review restricted to just two  
determinations.251F250 The Senate’s revisions thus made it far more difficult to 
defend the statute against a due process challenge. 
Second, the rationale for dispensing with ex ante procedures in the bank 
receivership context depends in significant part on a quid pro quo or waiver 
argument linked to government deposit insurance. The leading precedent is 
Fahey v. Mallonee, which involved a constitutional challenge to the takeover 
of a federally chartered savings and loan association by the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board. 252F251 In denying the saving and loan association’s constitu-
tional challenge, Justice Jackson alluded to the heightened need for public 
regulation of banks, given their susceptibility to panics and their potential 
impact on the wider economy. 253F252 He also reasoned that the association in 
that case was “estopped” from challenging the law because it had voluntarily 
sought a federal charter, knowing that a takeover was possible should the 
Bank Board become concerned about its financial condition. 254F253 As Justice 
Jackson put it, “[i]t would be intolerable that the Congress should endow an 
Association with the right to conduct a public banking business on certain 
limitations and that the Court at the behest of those who took advantage 
from the privilege should remove the limitations intended for public 
protection.” 255F254  
The quid pro quo theme has recurred in more recent cases involving due 
process challenges to various administrative actions taken by bank regulators; 
often, the courts in these cases emphasize the benefit of deposit insurance to 
banks, namely that it greatly promotes public confidence in the banking 
system. 256F255 Ordinary bank receiverships and related summary actions occur 
 
249 See supra text accompanying notes 89-97.  
250 See supra note 113.  
251 332 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1947). The challenge was grounded in the nondelegation doctrine, but 
the Supreme Court addressed the limited procedural protections in its analysis. Id. at 252-55 & n.1. 
252 Id. at 256.  
253 Id. at 250, 256.  
254 Id. 
255 See, e.g., FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 248 (1988) (rejecting a due process challenge to a 
statutory provision authorizing the FDIC to suspend from office a bank official indicted for 
crime); James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099-1101 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting a due 
process challenge to OCC and FDIC actions declaring a bank holding company insolvent and 
seizing company assets); Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. DLG Fin. Corp., 29 F.3d 993, 
1000-03 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a due process challenge to a preliminary injunction freezing 
assets of a corporation and its sole shareholder for possible violations of the Bank Holding 
Company Act); Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1439-42 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a due process 
challenge to a temporary cease and desist order requiring a former bank officer to pay $21 million 
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in a context in which the most significant assets of the insolvent bank—the 
deposits made by its customers—are insured by the federal government, 
giving the federal government strong justification for moving quickly and 
without advance notice to take over an insolvent bank in order to limit the 
government’s exposure on its insurance obligations. This context also allows 
the government to say that the bank voluntarily assumed the risk of  
summary action in exchange for taxpayers’ promise to foot the bill for any 
missteps or even misconduct by the bank. The banks, one could say, must 
take the bitter with the sweet. 257F256 
This sort of quid pro quo argument cannot easily be extended to the 
nonbank financial firms subject to Title II orderly liquidation. 258F257 Large 
nonbank financial firms are not chartered by the government and do not 
have the close interaction with regulatory agencies that characterizes banks. 
They may be subject to oversight by the Securities Exchange Commission 
or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, but such oversight does 
not rise to the same level of scrutiny as the visitorial authority that regulators 
exercise over banks. 259F258 And, of course, the government does not formally 
insure funds and investments held by clients in these nonbank financial 
firms. Perhaps TARP and the bailout regime could be characterized as an 
implicit guarantee by the government that systemically significant firms will 
not be allowed to fail, but Title II is designed to eliminate such a guarantee. 
Indeed, Title II was designed to ensure the government will never again 
foot the bill for any capital infusions required by the resolution process. 
Framed in these terms, it is much more difficult to claim that the government 
has delivered enough of the “sweet” to declare that firms liquidated under 
 
dollars in restitution pending administrative review); FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.2d 1122, 
1129-32 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that review of a capital directive to a bank was prohibited since 
issuance of the directive was left to the FDIC’s discretion, and the administrative process from 
which the directive and the enforcement order resulted satisfied due process); Haralson v. Fed. 
Home Loan Bank Bd., 837 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (rejecting a due process challenge to 
the appointment of a conservator pursuant to a statute providing for review only after seizure of 
assets). 
256 Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (plurality opinion) (advancing a “bitter 
with the sweet” argument in the context of a due process challenge); id. at 166-67 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the result in part) (rejecting the argument); id. at 177-78, 185 
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(same). 
257 See Zaring, supra note 218, at 129-30 (arguing that the FDIC should not be able “to act to 
take over and shut down institutions that it does not insure or regulate”).  
258 See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 526-27 (2009) (explaining that 
“visitorial” powers give the controlling authority the right to superintend the management of the 
entity, standing in stark contrast to the powers of a regulator possessing only the authority to 
redress grievances and frauds). 
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Title II have voluntarily assumed the risk of getting the “bitter.” Consequently, 
Dodd–Frank’s OLA cannot be justified by the kind of estoppel argument 
adopted in Fahey v. Mallonee.260F259  
Sadly and ironically, the short notice required by the statute will produce 
an advantage in litigation for the government that will be extremely difficult 
for the financial company to overcome. The government, for example, can 
prepare briefs in advance suggesting that the sky will fall if a systemically 
significant firm is not immediately placed in receivership. The government 
can also anticipate the due process objections and can have its briefs well 
prepared with extensive citations to banking and public health emergency 
cases. The financial firm and other interested parties, on the other hand, 
may be caught by surprise and find it nearly impossible to rebut these 
authorities in the condensed period of time they have to respond. The 
violation of due process may itself assure that the due process defense fails, 
at the very least for those stakeholders who receive no notice until after the 
receivership is approved.  
The last point to make in connection with the due process issues raised 
by Title II is that these problems would have been easily avoided if Congress 
had followed the Administration’s Combined Draft and the House bill that 
both provided for administrative appointment of a receiver followed by a 
statutory right to post-seizure judicial review. 261F260 It is well established that 
some kind of hearing is required before a property owner is conclusively 
deprived of a protected property interest. 262F261 However, it is not always 
necessary that the hearing occur before the initial taking.263F262 Specifically, the 
 
259 332 U.S. 245, 255-56 (1947) (providing that “[i]t is an elementary rule of constitutional 
law that one may not retain the benefits of the Act while attacking the constitutionality of one of 
its important conditions” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
260 See Administration’s Combined Draft, supra note 15, § 1205; see also Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1605 (2009). 
261 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433-434 (1982) (“[T]he state may 
not finally destroy a property interest without first giving the putative owner an opportunity to 
present his claim of entitlement.” (citation omitted)); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972) 
(providing that “the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
262 See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (noting that 
“[o]n occasion, th[e] Court has recognized that where the potential length or severity of the 
deprivation does not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and where the procedures underlying the 
decision to act are sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk of erroneous determination, government 
may act without providing additional advance procedural safeguards” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977) (finding that the need to 
provide additional procedural safeguards depends on a balancing of the benefits and costs of those 
procedures); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-34 (1976) (describing cases in which a full-
fledged evidentiary hearing was not required before the initial taking); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 
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timing, nature and procedural requirements of any mandatory hearing 
under the Due Process Clause will depend on balancing the competing 
interests involved. 264F263 These include the importance of the private interest, 
the length or finality of the deprivation at issue, the probability of government 
error, and the importance of governmental interests involved, including the 
administrative practicality of providing an ex ante hearing and the sufficiency 
of substitute ex post procedures.265F264 Given the substantial public interest in 
avoiding a financial panic, the practical constraints on providing advance 
notice to numerous creditors with property interests at stake and the need 
for expedition, it is hard to imagine a court finding ex post review unjustified.  
As we have seen, for practical reasons, banks only rarely invoke their 
right to seek post-seizure review. But the availability of such review is an 
important safeguard against executive abuse of the enormous power conferred 
by Title II. Post-seizure review eliminates the notice problem, because all 
the world will know about the receiver’s appointment. Ex post review also 
eliminates the need to rush through the proceeding in twenty-four hours or 
truncate the issues so that only a fraction of the potential points of legal 
controversy are subject to review. The Senate blundered in thinking that a 
sham review before appointment of a receiver is preferable to a right to 
plenary review afterwards.  
B. Article III 
 The compressed process for obtaining a judicial order establishing a 
FDIC receivership is also vulnerable to challenge on Article III grounds. 
Indeed, the Article III objection may strike an even more sympathetic chord 
with courts than the due process claim, because it implicates the constitutional 
authority and autonomy of the courts as a separate branch of the federal 
government. 
We hasten to point out that the Article III issue is not the one typically 
associated with bankruptcy laws, as in Stern v. Marshall 266F265 or Northern 
 
57, 62 (1919) (upholding the constitutionality of a taking that precedes the determination of just 
compensation). 
263 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (explaining that “resolution of the issue 
of whether the administrative procedures provided . . . are constitutionally sufficient requires 
analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected” (citation omitted)). 
264 FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240-41 (1988); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 339-49.  
265 See 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2011) (holding that a non-Article III bankruptcy judge cannot 
constitutionally enter a final judgment on a counterclaim based on state law unless the counterclaim 
“stems out of the bankruptcy” or “would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process”). 
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Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 267F266 In those cases, the 
Court was concerned with whether the Bankruptcy Court—an Article I 
tribunal—could resolve claims of private right under the common law of 
contract and tort subject only to deferential review by an Article III district 
court. The initiation of a Dodd–Frank OLA proceeding, in contrast, would 
almost surely be classified as involving public, rather than private, rights. 268F267 
An OLA action is commenced by a federal official, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and seeks the appointment of a federal agency (typically, the 
FDIC) as receiver. The decision to grant the petition and the standards for 
conducting the receivership are governed by federal, rather than state, law. 
The goal of the action is grounded in public interest considerations—
preventing a panic that would disrupt the financial markets and lead to 
economic distress—rather than in resolving claims between private debtors 
and creditors. Although the receivership will result in the resolution of 
numerous private claims, disposing of these claims is incidental to its 
primary purpose. Thus, although the Supreme Court has never identified a 
bright-line distinction between private and public rights, the OLA action 
seems to clearly fall on the public rights side of the line. The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly affirmed that public rights actions need not be tried in 
Article III courts, meaning Congress can choose whether such actions 
should be tried in either Article III courts or administrative tribunals.269F268 
Moreover, in contrast to the claims at issue in Marshall and Northern 
Pipeline, the decision to appoint a receiver and initiate a liquidation of a 
financial firm is formally made by an Article III court—the District Court 
for the District of Columbia—and not by an administrative body or an 
Article I court. The statute provides that, “[i]f the Court determines that 
 
266 See 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982) (holding that, while Congress may transfer traditional judicial 
functions to non-Article III tribunals for those matters concerning statutorily created rights, it is 
precluded from altering the adjudication of rights not created by statute and, accordingly, must 
limit the functions of the adjunct court to preserve a party’s rights to adjudication by an Article III 
court). 
267 Thus, we question the analysis in Brent J. Horton, How Dodd–Frank’s Orderly Liquidation 
Authority for Financial Companies Violates Article III of the United States Constitution, 36 J. CORP. L. 
869 (2011), which implicitly treats the appointment of a receiver as a matter of private right for 
Article III purposes. On the constitutional distinction between public and private rights, as 
reflected in the jurisprudence of Article III, see generally Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-70; 
Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (2007).  
268 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57-58 (1932) (explaining that Congress can create 
administrative tribunals by statute, with limitations on their scope of review); Den ex dem. Murray 
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855) (“[T]here are matters, involving 
public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on 
them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which [C]ongress may or may not 
bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.”).  
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the determination of the Secretary [on the two reviewable determinations] 
is not arbitrary and capricious, the Court shall issue an order immediately 
authorizing the Secretary to appoint the [FDIC] as receiver of the covered 
financial company.” 270F269 There is no attempt here to transfer authority away 
from an Article III court to some other tribunal. The authority to appoint 
the receiver is formally conferred by an order issued by the district court. 271F270 
The statute further avoids traditional Northern Pipeline–type problems by 
allowing creditors of the financial firm subject to the OLA to bring an 
action in federal district court if they are dissatisfied with the receiver’s 
resolution of their claims. 272F271 The statute appears to contemplate that these 
judicial proceedings will be tried de novo—not under a standard of deferential 
administrative review.273F272 
The principal Article III problem with Dodd–Frank, rather, arises from 
its severe restrictions on the time that the Article III court is given to 
consider an important question, as well as the scope of the issues it can 
consider in resolving that question. 274F273 In effect, the statute calls upon an 
Article III court to make a significant decision, for both the financial firm 
and the economy, yet constrains the court in such a way that it cannot 
execute its duty to make this decision in a manner consistent with its Article 
III judicial power. One might say that Dodd–Frank commandeers the courts 
to lend their prestige and legitimacy to what is essentially an administrative 
process without respecting the traditional mode and manner in which 
Article III courts function. 275F274 In our view, any court told that it must rule on 
a petition to establish a receivership to liquidate a huge financial firm, and 
 
269 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2012) (emphasis added). 
270 The issue is admittedly murkier if the district court fails to make a determination within 
twenty-four hours. In such situations, the statute declares—in the passive voice—that “the petition 
shall be granted by operation of law” and then adds that “the Secretary shall appoint the Corporation 
as receiver.” Id. § 202(a)(1)(v)(A)(I)-(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(v)(I)-(II). Arguably, the Secretary 
of the Treasury is the appointing authority in these circumstances.  
271 Id. § 210(a)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(4). 
272 See id. (“[A] claimant may file suit on a claim (or continue an action commenced before 
the date of appointment of the Corporation as receiver) in the district or territorial court of the 
United States for the district within which the principal place of business of the covered financial 
company is located (and such court shall have jurisdiction to hear such claim).”). 
273 Perhaps this should be termed a separation of powers issue, rather than an Article III 
issue, to avoid confusion with Northern Pipeline–style claims. 
274 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that “[t]he Federal Government 
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the 
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory 
program” because “such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system 
of dual sovereignty”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (finding that the 
principles of federalism do not permit Congress to commandeer state governments to act as 
enforcement agents of federal law). 
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that it has only twenty-four hours to consider the question, will be unhappy 
with its appointed role. 
One sign of judicial discomfort with Dodd–Frank is the D.C. District 
Court’s Local Civil Rule 85, which was amended to implement Dodd–Frank’s 
in camera procedure for appointment of a receiver. 276F275 The new Rule pro-
vides in part that “[t]he [Treasury] Secretary shall provide written notice 
under seal to the Clerk of the Court that a petition will likely be filed with 
the Court, and to the extent feasible, the notice will be provided at least 48 
hours prior to filing the petition.” 277F276 Dodd–Frank provides no authority for 
this advance notice requirement, although presumably the Secretary of the 
Treasury will attempt to comply. The additional forty-eight-hour notice is 
evidently designed to facilitate assignment of a judge to the matter and to 
allow that judge to clear his or her docket (as well as personal schedule) for 
the twenty-four-hour marathon that is to come.278F277 This procedural requirement 
will relieve some pressure on the judge deciding the petition, although the 
content of the petition itself and any objections by the financial firm will 
not be made available until the twenty-four-hour clock starts ticking. Local 
Civil Rule 85 thus cannot obviate the reality that a single judge must decide 
whether to order the liquidation of a systemically significant financial firm 
under circumstances reminiscent of a law school take-home examination.  
The Article III problem is exacerbated by the statute’s restriction preventing 
the court from reviewing five of the seven threshold determinations that 
must be resolved before an OLA receivership is established. The court may 
consider only whether the Secretary of the Treasury acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in finding that the firm (1) met the statutory definition of a 
“financial company” and (2) “is in default or in danger of default.” 279F278 The 
other five statutory triggering conditions cannot be considered by the 
court. 280F279 Yet the judgment the court is asked to render—granting a petition 
to appoint a receiver leading to mandatory liquidation—necessarily presupposes 
that all of the statutory triggering conditions have been met. The court 
may—and should—be uncomfortable rendering a judgment that rests on 
legal and factual determinations it is not empowered to review. Again, the 
objective of the statute appears to draw upon the prestige of the court as an 
 
275 D.D.C. CIV. R. 85. 
276 D.D.C. CIV. R. 85(b). 
277 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-735, BANKRUPTCY: AGENCIES 
CONTINUE RULEMAKINGS FOR CLARIFYING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ORDERLY LIQUIDATION 
AUTHORITY 15 (2012) (explaining that the forty-eight-hour warning was intended to give the 
court time to prepare for the review). 
278 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). 
279 See supra text accompanying notes 129-134.  
  
2014] Dodd–Frank: Too Big for the Constitution? 219 
 
independent tribunal to legitimize a process that is actually driven by the 
executive branch. Courts will not take kindly to being conscripted in this 
fashion. 
There is little precedent to draw upon in considering the Article III 
claim. The scope of judicial review under Dodd–Frank is arguably analogous 
to Hayburn’s Case, in which the courts were asked to render judgments 
subject to revision by the executive. 281F280 This practice was condemned on the 
ground that it made the courts’ judgments nothing more than advisory 
opinions. 282F281 The same conclusion should follow when the executive renders 
a decision that the court is asked to incorporate into a judgment without 
being given the time or the authority to make the independent determinations 
of fact and law necessary to render a proper judicial judgment. The judicial 
input in both instances lacks substance and serves only to transfer a measure 
of judicial prestige to an executive enterprise. Justice Douglas once warned 
that a statute that makes “the federal judiciary a rubber stamp for the 
President” would violate Article III. 283F282 “If the federal court is to be merely 
an automaton stamping the papers an Attorney General presents,” he wrote, 
“the judicial function rises to no higher level than an IBM machine.” 284F283 
Justice Douglas’s colleagues in the majority disagreed with his interpretation 
of the statute under review but not with his understanding that such a 
statute would violate Article III. 285F284  
The absence of meaningful precedent to assess the Article III claim is 
both a strength and a weakness for potential challengers. It is a strength 
insofar as Congress has never before attempted to draw upon the authority 
of the courts while simultaneously constraining their ability to function as a 
court in such a dramatic fashion. The unprecedented nature of Title II’s 
judicial appointment provisions makes them inherently suspect. Conversely, 
the novelty of this scheme is a weakness insofar as there is a presumption in 
favor of the constitutionality of duly enacted legislation, and courts like to 
draw upon clear constitutional language or settled authority before rendering 
a judgment that a congressional enactment is unconstitutional. 
 
280 See generally Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
281 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 83-90 (6th ed. 2009) (explaining the significance of Hayburn’s Case 
for understanding the role of Article III courts and noting that “judicial independence requires 
that the Article III courts not be subject to requisition by Congress or the executive to act as 
subordinates to those two branches in the performance of their characteristic functions”). 
282 United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 70-71 (1959) (Douglas, J.,  
dissenting). 
283 Id. at 71. 
284 See id. at 43 (majority opinion) (“Of matters decided judicially, there is no review by 
other agencies of the Government.”). 
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The provisions authorizing an appeal from a district court order appointing 
a receiver raise further Article III questions. If the district court grants the 
petition to appoint a receiver, or if the petition is granted as a matter of law 
because the district court fails to act within twenty-four hours, the decision 
“shall be final, and shall be subject to appeal only in accordance with [the 
appeal provisions of Title II].” 286F285 Moreover, “[t]he decision shall not be 
subject to any stay or injunction pending appeal.” 287F286 If this last sentence is 
interpreted to mean that the D.C. Circuit (and, later, the Supreme Court on 
a petition for certiorari) has no authority to enjoin or set aside the decision 
of the district court once it becomes final, then the “appeal” would have no 
function other than to render an advisory opinion as to whether the district 
court acted correctly. This would be a plain violation of Article III. 288F287 To 
avoid this conclusion, one must focus on the word “pending” in the sentence 
that prohibits any stay or injunction “pending appeal.” This language should 
be interpreted to mean that no stay or injunction can be entered while an 
appeal is pending before the court of appeals and the Supreme Court, but 
once the final appellate decision is rendered, those appellate courts have 
authority to overturn the district court decision if they conclude that the 
Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 289F288  
Nevertheless, we are not out of the woods yet. As previously noted, 
Dodd–Frank appears to provide that the only relief the court of appeals or 
the Supreme Court can grant, if either concludes that the district court 
erred, is a remand for further explanation of the findings by the Secretary of 
the Treasury. 290F289 If the receivership goes forward and the only authority of 
the appellate courts is to require a better administrative explanation for 
what is already a fait accompli, how does this virtually meaningless appellate 
review satisfy the prohibition on advisory opinions? Unless the statute is 
interpreted to allow the court of appeals or the Supreme Court to enjoin the 
receivership, Dodd–Frank’s appeals provisions violate Article III. However, 
it is hardly clear that Congress intended to confer the authority to issue an 
injunction.  
If Dodd–Frank is interpreted as allowing the court of appeals or the  
Supreme Court to enjoin a receivership on appeal or a petition for certiorari, 
and as imposing no time limit on the court of appeals or the Supreme Court 
 
285 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(B) (2012).  
286 Id. 
287 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 281, at 52 (“The prohibition against advisory opinions has 
been termed ‘the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
288 We thank Ron Levin for suggesting this interpretation.  
289 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv)(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(II).  
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in reaching its determination as to whether the Secretary’s two findings are 
arbitrary and capricious, does this solve the Article III problem? Such an 
interpretation means that these two courts would not be dragooned into 
rendering decisions in a time period too compressed to allow them to act in 
proper judicial fashion. However, this interpretation would still subject the 
district court to the incredibly tight turnaround time. And the court of 
appeals and the Supreme Court would still be limited to considering only 
two of the seven factors that authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to 
petition for a receivership in the first place. As previously discussed, this 
limitation presents an independent due process problem, and might also be 
construed as presenting an Article III problem, insofar as the court of 
appeals and the Supreme Court are being asked to restrict their review to 
only a subset of the legal issues that led to the receiver’s appointment. 
Again, this restriction arguably represents an attempt by Congress to 
exploit the prestige of the judiciary while preventing it from properly 
discharging its judicial function. 
Can the district court avoid any insult to its judicial independence by 
simply declining to rule on the petition, in which case the petition would 
take effect in twenty-four hours by operation of law? By refusing to lend its 
prestige to a process that forces the court to act in a nonjudicial manner, the 
district court would preserve its dignity.291F290 However, the financial firm 
could still appeal, in which case the Article III question regarding limiting 
the courts’ review to two of the seven determinations would still come up. 
More seriously, refusing to rule would spare the court’s dignity at the 
expense of the parties subject to orderly liquidation. Indeed, by declining to 
participate in the OLA schema, the court would only exacerbate the due 
process problem. Not only would the parties be denied all post-seizure 
judicial review, they would not even get the extremely abbreviated pre-seizure 
review provided under the statute. Seizure of systemically significant 
financial firms would therefore take place based on the unreviewable say-so 
of the executive branch. 
 
290 Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 ( Jackson, J., dissenting) (“A military 
commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if [the Court] 
review[s] and approve[s] [those actions], that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the 
Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own 
image. Nothing better illustrates this danger than does the Court’s opinion in this case.”). Even if 
the petition is granted by operation of law (because the district court declined to rule within the 
twenty-four-hour timeframe), the district court is still required to “provide . . . for the record a 
written statement of each reason supporting [its] decision.” Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(B), 12 
U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(B).  
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C. Avoidance, Anyone? 
Before concluding our discussion of the process objections to Title II, 
another wrinkle should be considered—namely, whether the statute can be 
construed in a way that would eliminate these constitutional problems. 292F291 
An avoidance reading of Dodd–Frank might find that, although the statute 
severely limits what the court can consider and how the court must go about 
its review, the APA can be construed in a way that would supplement the 
court’s review authority, thereby eliminating possible due process and 
Article III objections.  
Recall again that the statute requires the Secretary to make seven  
determinations before seeking appointment of a receiver but allows the 
district court to review only two of those determinations. 293F292 Is it possible 
for a financial firm facing appointment of a receiver to obtain review of the 
other five determinations under the APA, without being shackled by  
Dodd–Frank’s twenty-four-hour time limit and arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review? The APA provides that “[a]gency action[s] made 
reviewable by statute and final agency action[s] for which there is no other 
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” 294F293 This would seem 
to fit the supposed situation, given that there is no other adequate remedy 
in court if the Secretary of the Treasury has committed legal or factual error 
with respect to five of the determinations. Indeed, because Dodd–Frank’s 
review provisions severely constrain the court with respect to the two 
determinations it can review—imposing a time limit so short it effectively 
deprives a firm of any adequate judicial remedy—one could argue that all 
seven determinations meet the criteria for review under the APA: the 
review process prescribed by Dodd–Frank is plainly not “adequate.”  
Can we say the Secretary of the Treasury’s decision to file a petition is a 
“final agency action” under the APA? The Supreme Court has instructed 
that “two conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be ‘final’: First, 
the action must mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking 
process—it must not be of a tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, 
the action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ 
or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’” 295F294  
 
291 See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (interpreting the 
National Labor Relations Act to not cover lay employees of religious schools in order to avoid 
deciding whether such authority would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment). 
292 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), (iv)(I), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii), (iv)(I) (2012). 
293 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (emphasis added). 
294 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (citations omitted).  
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Here, the first factor is clearly met. The Secretary’s decisionmaking process 
culminates in filing the petition to appoint a receiver, after which he bows 
out and turns the proceedings over to the court and the FDIC.  
The second factor is more problematic. In formal terms, the D.C. District 
Court, not the Secretary of the Treasury, authorizes appointment of the 
receiver. The “legal consequences” (which are considerable) therefore flow 
from the court’s decision to grant the petition, not the Secretary’s decision 
to file it. Realistically speaking, however, the Secretary’s decision is the one 
that matters. The court has only limited grounds available for rejecting a 
petition (and then may only remand to the Secretary for further findings) 
and has only twenty-four hours to make its determination. One way to 
think through this problem is to focus on the way the statute handcuffs the 
court by permitting it to review only two of the Secretary’s seven determi-
nations. As to the remaining five factors, the Secretary’s decision is fully 
and effectively “final,” since the Dodd–Frank Act does not permit judicial 
review. And the factors that are unreviewable by the court are among the 
most critical ones to financial firms regulated under Dodd–Frank.296F295 
A more serious problem is presented by section 701(a) of the APA, which 
exempts matters from APA review when the relevant “statute preclude[s] 
judicial review” or the “agency action is committed to agency discretion by 
law.” 297F296 The government would surely move to dismiss any action seeking 
review under the APA of the Secretary of the Treasury’s five determinations 
(or all seven) on the ground that Dodd–Frank makes these findings  
unreviewable. Absent a constitutional avoidance issue, we would regard the 
government’s argument as a dispositive objection. While Dodd–Frank does 
not expressly preclude review of these five determinations, it specifically 
states that the district court can only consider the two delineated determi-
nations. And the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court are expressly limited 
to those two determinations in their review. Courts have previously found 
that a statute’s inclusion of one type of review should be regarded as 
excluding other types of review. 298F297 That inference is particularly strong 
under Dodd–Frank’s language. Once the constitutional avoidance canon is 
added to the mix, however, it becomes a closer call. Given the strong 
arguments that Dodd–Frank’s review provisions violate due process and 
Article III, a court would likely strain mightily to find that APA review has 
 
295 See supra text accompanying note 237. 
296 Administrative Procedure Act, § 5 U.S.C. 701(a) (2012). 
297 See, e.g., Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347 (1984) (finding that the omission 
of a provision in the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 allowing for judicial review of the 
Secretary of Agriculture’s issuance of market orders was “sufficient reason to believe that Congress 
intended to foreclose consumer participation in the regulatory process”). 
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not been precluded and can therefore supplement Dodd–Frank’s procedural 
deficiencies. 299F298 A sensible court would, of course, seek to harmonize APA 
review with the congressional judgment that the appointment of a receiver 
must be resolved quickly and confidentially and, accordingly, would likely 
set a timetable for APA review that requires considerable dispatch and 
maintains secrecy, at least until a final judgment is reached.  
The government might also argue that, even if review of the five deter-
minations is not precluded by statute, these determinations are committed 
to agency discretion by law. One common refrain here is that matters are 
presumptively reviewable as long as there is “law to apply.”300F299 The five 
determinations Dodd–Frank sets out for the Secretary’s consideration (in 
addition to the two made reviewable by the district court) vary in terms of 
whether they seem to be left to the Secretary’s discretion or require the 
Secretary’s application of law to fact. For example, whether the failure of a 
financial firm would have “serious adverse effects on financial stability in the 
United States” would seem to be a determination one would want the 
Secretary of the Treasury, not an Article III court, to make. 301F300 On the other 
hand, whether “a Federal regulatory agency has ordered the financial firm to 
convert all of its convertible debt instruments that are subject to the regulatory 
order” seems to be a factor as to which there is abundant “law to apply.”302F301 
As long as at least one contested determination includes debatable legal or 
factual issues of the sort that courts often adjudicate, the “committed to 
agency discretion” argument would fail. Again, courts’ desire to avoid 
deeply unsettling constitutional questions might well tip the balance in 
favor of finding that at least some of the Secretary of the Treasury’s  
determinations are not committed to agency discretion by law. 
 
298 Judicial attitudes about the canon of avoiding constructions of doubtful constitutionality 
are mixed. Some decisions say that the canon comes into play only when the underlying statute 
(here, the APA) is genuinely ambiguous or indeterminate. E.g., Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 
52, 59-60 (1997). Other decisions invoke the canon to support reading implicit limitations into 
seemingly unqualified statutory language. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688-99 (2001); 
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 505 (1979). For decisions discussing the use of the 
avoidance canon in the bankruptcy context, see Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2605 (2011); 
United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1982). 
299 See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600 (1988) (providing that “review is not to 
be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to 
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Citizens 
to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (stating that “the Administrative 
Procedure Act is applicable in those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms 
that there is no law to apply” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
300 Dodd–Frank Act § 203(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2) (2012). 
301 Id. § 203(b)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(6).  
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS 
 Dodd–Frank’s orderly liquidation authority may be vulnerable on other 
constitutional grounds that implicate the authority of Congress to mandate 
the kind of receivership contemplated by Title II. This Section looks at two 
possible constitutional objections—one grounded in the uniformity  
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause and the other based on the First 
Amendment. 
A. Uniform Laws of Bankruptcy 
The Constitution confers power on Congress to adopt “uniform Laws 
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” 303F302 One 
possible objection to Dodd–Frank’s OLA is that it does not constitute a 
uniform bankruptcy regime. Instead, the government is instructed to 
determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether to subject a nonbank financial 
firm to ordinary rules of bankruptcy or to put the firm on a different track 
reserved for systemically significant nonbank financial firms. The result is 
different resolution processes for different financial firms, based on a highly 
discretionary determination by executive branch agencies as to which is 
more appropriate. The fact that Title II contains significantly more punitive 
elements than the ordinary bankruptcy regime makes this discretionary 
authority especially problematic. A distinct uniformity objection to the 
OLA is that the statute authorizes the FDIC to treat similarly situated 
creditors differently if necessary to maximize the value of the failing firm’s 
assets, to initiate or continue operations essential to receivership, or to 
minimize losses. 304F303 In the Big Spring litigation, the state plaintiffs cite this 
potential lack of uniformity as grounds for establishing their standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of Dodd–Frank. 305F304 
The meaning of the “uniform laws” limitation in the Bankruptcy Clause 
is not entirely clear. 306F305 The leading case, Railway Labor Executives Ass’n v. 
Gibbons, construed the limitation to mean that Congress has no power to 
 
302 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
303 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(b)(4).  
304 See supra text accompanying notes 192-194.  
305 The Federalist Papers contain only one sentence about the Bankruptcy Power. THE  
FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 221 ( James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001) (“The power of establishing 
uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will 
prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or be removed into different 
States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.”).  
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enact a law reorganizing a single debtor. 307F306 Thus, under Gibbons, if Congress 
were to enact a law prescribing an orderly liquidation procedure applicable 
only to a single nonbank financial firm, the law could be challenged as an 
unconstitutional exercise of the bankruptcy power. The question is whether 
a similar conclusion follows when Congress prescribes a specialized resolution 
authority for a subset of financial firms and gives the executive branch broad 
discretion in applying this specialized regime.  
In Gibbons, the Supreme Court considered the Rock Island Railroad 
Transition and Employee Assistance Act (RITA), a law passed specifically 
to address the circumstances of the Rock Island Railroad bankruptcy.308F307 
Among other things, the law required the railroad’s bankruptcy trustee to 
provide certain economic benefits to railroad employees who were not hired 
by other railroad carriers.309F308 In considering whether RITA was constitutional, 
the Court addressed two issues: First, whether RITA should be regarded as 
having been enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause, which requires 
laws passed under it to be “uniform,” or pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 
which lacks this uniformity requirement.310F309 Second, whether the Bankruptcy 
Clause’s uniformity requirement prohibits a bankruptcy law that applies to 
only one debtor.311F310  
The first issue—whether RITA was enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy 
Clause or the Commerce Clause—was critical, because the Court recog-
nized that “if [the Court] were to hold that Congress had the power to enact 
nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, [it] would 
eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to 
enact bankruptcy laws.” 312F311 The Court therefore had to determine whether 
RITA fell within the ambit of the bankruptcy power. After surveying its 
prior decisions, the Gibbons court concluded that the bankruptcy power 
“extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed, the property of 
the debtor among his creditors.” 313F312 Congress’s bankruptcy power “includes 
the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities, as 
well as to distribute his property.” 314F313 In short, the Court held that any law 
 
306 See 455 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (“[T]he uniformity requirement of the [Bankruptcy] Clause 
prohibits Congress from enacting bankruptcy laws that specifically apply to the affairs of only one 
named debtor.”).  
307 Id. at 462-63. 
308 Id. at 462.  
309 Id. at 468-69. 
310 Id. at 470-71.  
311 Id. at 468-69. 
312 Id. at 466 (quoting Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 186 (1902)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
313 Id. (quoting Hanover Nat’l Bank, 186 U.S. at 188) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  
2014] Dodd–Frank: Too Big for the Constitution? 227 
 
that discharges the contracts and other legal liabilities of a debtor and 
distributes its property among creditors is a law adopted under the bankruptcy 
power. 315F314 Under the rationale of Gibbons, therefore, Title II of Dodd–Frank 
must be regarded as enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause and thus 
subject to its “uniform laws” requirement. 
With respect to the second issue, the Gibbons court acknowledged that 
the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause “is not a straightjacket 
that forbids Congress to distinguish among classes of debtors, nor does it 
prohibit Congress from recognizing that state laws do not treat commercial 
transactions in a uniform manner.” 316F315 In addition, the Court recognized 
Congress’s power to “take into account differences that exist between 
different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geographically 
isolated problems,” as it had done in the Conrail bankruptcy. 317F316 But RITA 
was a different matter:  
The employee protection provisions of RITA cover neither a defined class 
of debtors nor a particular type of problem, but a particular problem of one 
bankrupt railroad. Albeit on a rather grand scale, RITA is nothing more 
than a private bill such as those Congress frequently enacts under its authority 
to spend money.318F317 
The Court concluded that “[t]he language of the Bankruptcy Clause itself 
compels us to hold that such a bankruptcy law is not within the power of 
Congress to enact.” 319F318  
The Court supported this conclusion by examining the history of the 
Bankruptcy Clause. 320F319 The Clause was added to the Constitution during 
deliberations about the problem of affording full faith and credit to the legal 
actions of other states. 321F320 Several states had followed the practice of passing 
private bills to relieve individual debtors, and questions had been raised 
about whether other states were obliged to recognize the relief granted by 
these acts. 322F321 The Court thus opined that “the Bankruptcy Clause’s  
 
314 Id. at 466-67.  
315 Id. at 469.  
316 Id. (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 159 (1974)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
317 Id. at 470-71. 
318 Id. at 471. 
319 Id. at 471-72. 
320 Id.  
321 Id.  
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uniformity requirement was drafted in order to prohibit Congress from 
enacting private bankruptcy laws.”323F322  
After Gibbons, therefore, it is presumably unconstitutional for Congress 
to enact a law providing special rules applicable solely to the resolution of a 
specific nonbank financial firm. It should thus also be unconstitutional for 
Congress to delegate authority to the executive branch to adopt specialized 
rules for the reorganization of a single nonbank financial firm. Congress 
cannot delegate to an agency power that exceeds Congress’s own authority 
to act. 324F323 Does Dodd–Frank overstep the limitations of Congress’s  
bankruptcy power? It certainly comes close, given the extraordinary  
discretion granted to the Treasury Department and allied federal agencies in 
determining whether a financial company should be reorganized under Title 
II, as opposed to under general bankruptcy laws. Title II’s OLA may never 
be invoked, or may be invoked so rarely that it is tantamount to a one-off 
bankruptcy regime. Nonetheless, the decision whether to apply such a 
regime will be left almost entirely to the executive branch’s discretion, under 
a statute that disallows review of most of that branch’s determinations. 
There is, however, a distinction between Dodd–Frank and a bankruptcy 
regime that amounts to a private bill. After Dodd–Frank, there are two 
insolvency laws applicable to large nonbank financial firms—one for most 
nonbank financial firms (the Bankruptcy Code) and the other for firms 
deemed too big to fail by the executive (Dodd–Frank Title II). Congress 
enacted both laws and has further instructed the executive to decide, on an 
ad hoc basis, which of the two packages of insolvency rules should apply in 
an individual case. If Congress had prescribed clear legal criteria for deter-
mining when Package A, as opposed to Package B, applies and had allowed 
ordinary judicial review of the executive’s determination, the coexistence of 
these two sets of laws would likely be constitutional. After all, Congress has 
legislated different approaches to resolve insolvency in different industries, 
like railroads,325F324 federally insured depository banks,326F325 and insurance  
companies.327F326 Legislation targeting particular industries inevitably presents 
 
322 Id. at 472. 
323 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (holding that an  
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power cannot be cured by a limiting administrative 
interpretation). 
324 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1164–1174 (2012) (delineating provisions pertaining exclusively to the  
bankruptcy of railroads).  
325 See Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (2012) (establishing the FDIC 
as the receiver for all federally insured banks). 
326 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)-(3), (d) (establishing that insurance companies are not entitled 
to relief pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code and hence the exclusive venue for such companies’ 
insolvency relief is found under state law).  
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classification questions, which historically have been resolved using ordinary 
tools of statutory interpretation. 
Dodd–Frank presents a less clear case under the “uniformity” requirement, 
because it provides for two different insolvency regimes within a single 
industry. Moreover, the factors used to decide which package of rules 
applies are highly discretionary and, as previously discussed, the provisions 
for judicial review are severely truncated. By enacting Dodd–Frank,  
Congress has essentially proclaimed the following: here is a new package of 
bankruptcy rules for firms that are too big to fail, and the executive gets to 
decide, with essentially unreviewable discretion, which firms fall into that 
category.328F327 It is difficult to describe this as a “uniform law” of bankruptcy, 
but it presents a problem of a different order from the statute invalidated in 
Gibbons. So the uniformity objection, as applied to Dodd–Frank, would sail 
into largely uncharted waters. Given that Dodd–Frank sets forth a regime 
for resolving the insolvency of firms that are too big to fail and does not 
seek to dictate special treatment for specific classes of creditors in pending 
cases, we doubt that the courts would extend Gibbons to reach this situation. 
But the argument is not frivolous.  
What then about the other uniformity problem cited by the Big Spring 
plaintiffs—that is, the Dodd–Frank provision allowing the FDIC to treat 
similarly situated creditors differently in order to maximize the value of the 
 
327 A constitutional purist might insist that Dodd–Frank gives so much discretion to the 
executive in this regard that it violates the nondelegation doctrine. We do not pursue this inquiry 
here, because the Supreme Court has refused to find a nondelegation violation provided Congress 
has laid down any kind of standard to govern executive decisionmaking. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 
U.S. at 474-76 (finding that the Clean Air Act’s instruction to the EPA to set “ambient air quality 
standards” as “requisite to protect the public health,” without providing outer bounds for such 
EPA regulations, “fits comfortably within the scope of [agency] discretion permitted by [the 
Court’s] precedent”); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-53 (1947) (holding that the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board’s regulatory discretion is guided by “well-known and generally acceptable 
standards” drawn from the long history of banking regulation and corporate management and 
hence does not violate the nondelegation doctrine). Dodd–Frank sets forth seven “determinations” 
that must be made before a receivership is commenced, which is more than enough to meet the lax 
requirements of the contemporary nondelegation doctrine. To be sure, decisions like Fahey have 
stressed that broad delegations are permissible, in part, because judicial review is available to hold 
the executive in check. 332 U.S. at 256; see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (1976) 
(Leventhal, J., concurring) (“Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly—
and courts have upheld such delegations—because there is court review to assure that the agency 
exercises the delegated power within statutory limits, and that it fleshes out objectives within 
those limits by an administration that is not irrational or discriminatory.”). As previously 
discussed, judicial review of the decision to seize a firm and put it into receivership is sharply 
limited under Dodd–Frank. Whether courts will continue to stress the need for judicial review, 
however, is unclear. See Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and Judicial Review, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 73 (2010) (considering the constitutionality of broad delegations of power in the absence of 
judicial review). 
  
230 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 165 
 
firm’s assets?329F328 Assuming that Dodd–Frank does in fact contemplate that 
the FDIC can pick and choose among similarly situated creditors, 330F329 it is 
not clear that such discretion would constitute a violation of the “uniform 
laws” requirement. One can have a law that uniformly provides for dissimilar, 
or even random, treatment of similarly situated claimants. An example 
might be a bankruptcy law providing that creditors will be selected for 
payment by lottery. We do not suggest that such a law would be desirable; 
uniform treatment of similarly situated creditors is an unquestionably 
important policy of the bankruptcy laws and is critical to overcoming the 
competitive race among creditors to capture a limited pool of assets, which 
bankruptcy is designed to prevent. 331F330 By permitting the FDIC to treat 
similarly situated creditors differently, Dodd–Frank may incite a competitive 
race between creditors to influence federal regulators to favor one over 
others. Nevertheless, deviation from sound bankruptcy principles does not 
necessarily equate to a violation of the uniformity requirement. In our view, 
“uniform laws” means that one debtor cannot constitutionally be singled out 
for dissimilar treatment, but it is probably a stretch to say the Constitution 
requires that all similarly situated creditors be treated alike.  
B. First Amendment 
The Dodd–Frank Act’s provision imposing stiff criminal penalties on 
persons who disclose truthful information about pending cases in an Article 
III judicial proceeding is also vulnerable to constitutional challenge. 332F331 Of 
course, judicial proceedings are sometimes conducted in camera, such as 
when a grand jury considers whether to bring a criminal indictment or when 
the government seeks a search or arrest warrant. Discovery materials or 
settlement agreements can also be kept under seal, as when the parties 
stipulate to a confidentiality agreement. However, the idea that a defendant 
 
328 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(b)(4) (2012). 
329 The statute, in fact, says that all claimants “that are similarly situated . . . shall be treated 
in a similar manner,” subject to exception where the FDIC determines it is necessary to deviate 
from equality in order to maximize the value of estate assets. Id. The government argued in Big 
Spring that this exception would apply only in narrow circumstances, such as where payment to 
utilities should be continued to keep on the company’s lights. A narrowing construction to this 
effect would greatly undermine the States’ argument regarding dissimilar treatment of creditors. 
See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) at 46-48, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. 
Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d. 127 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-1032), ECF No. 26. 
330 See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 758 
(1984) (“The essence of a collective proceeding such as bankruptcy is ratable distribution among 
those similarly situated.”). 
331 Dodd–Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(C). 
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in an adversarial judicial proceeding brought by the government can, 
without his or her consent, be criminally punished for disclosing truthful 
facts about that proceeding is without precedent. 
One can readily imagine circumstances in which Dodd–Frank’s statutory 
gag rule would raise serious First Amendment concerns. For instance, 
suppose a financial firm is notified that a petition has been filed to appoint a 
receiver to liquidate the firm under Title II. The firm believes that the 
petition has been filed because it has been placed on the President’s 
“enemies list,” aimed at punishing those firms that have not contributed to 
his reelection campaign. The firm further concludes that its only hope of 
salvation is to leak information about the pending receivership to the press 
in an effort to rally opposition to the executive’s move. Dodd–Frank would 
deter such a disclosure by imposing criminal punishment of up to five years’ 
imprisonment for speaking out about these occurrences. 333F332  
A First Amendment challenge to Dodd–Frank’s gag rule may never 
arise, because, typically, none of the parties to the receivership proceeding 
will have an interest in disclosure. Other than the executive branch officials 
and court personnel involved, only the officers and directors of the targeted 
firm will know about the proceeding, “and they are probably the last ones 
who would want the petition for a receivership to be disclosed.” 334F333 This is 
particularly true in a case where the firm is about to collapse and the 
government is acting in good faith when invoking the OLA. But, as with 
other provisions of the Bill of Rights, Congress adopted the First Amendment 
on the assumption that the government would not always operate in good 
faith. It is likely that Dodd–Frank’s criminal penalties for disclosing truthful 
information about an OLA proceeding could be challenged only by someone 
proposing to engage in potentially criminal conduct. 335F334 So the critical 
question is whether its constitutionality would be sustained in such a context. 
 
332 Id.  
333 Baird & Morrison, supra note 48, at 298.  
334 Clapper v. Amnesty International USA appears to bar an anticipatory challenge to the gag 
rule by a creditor anxious to receive information about a petition to put a financial firm into 
receivership. 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146-54 (2013) (explaining that a party’s standing theory cannot rest 
on a speculative chain of possibilities that does not establish that its potential injury is certainly 
impending). The Court has occasionally allowed parties to challenge statutes that impair the First 
Amendment rights of third parties, but only if they can show some kind of actual injury to 
themselves. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (explaining that the Supreme 
Court has altered its traditional rules on standing to permit litigants “to challenge a statute not 
because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or 
assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from 
constitutionally protected speech or expression”). We assume that a purely anticipatory challenge 
to Dodd–Frank’s gag rule would fail unless the party bringing the challenge could show that it, or 
some other entity with which it had a close relationship, was likely to be subject to the gag rule in 
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The government might argue that the gag rule is analogous to rules  
prohibiting witnesses in grand jury proceedings from disclosing their 
testimony. 336F335 But grand jury proceedings are not a final determination of 
criminal liability. If the grand jury returns an indictment, the defendant is 
free at trial to call relevant witnesses to testify in open court in an effort to 
be exonerated.337F336 In contrast, once a petition to appoint a receiver is  
approved under Dodd–Frank’s OLA, a receivership commences that 
inevitably leads to liquidation of the targeted firm and other irrevocable 
consequences, such as the elimination of stockholder equity, the limitation 
on creditors’ rights to recover more than the liquidation value of their 
claims, and the dismissal of all “responsible” officers and directors. In this 
sense, the Dodd–Frank gag rule is more analogous to an order closing a 
public trial—something highly disfavored under the First Amendment. 338F337  
The government may also seek to analogize the gag rule to the rules of 
secrecy associated with proceedings to obtain search warrants, confidentiality 
agreements, civil commitment proceedings, or juvenile trials. But these 
various secrecy rules can be explained on grounds of consent. Government 
employees involved in judicial proceedings for issuing warrants or orders for 
national security wiretaps can be prohibited from disclosing what goes on in 
these proceedings, because they have explicitly or implicitly agreed to these 
constraints by accepting public employment. 339F338 Confidentiality agreements 
 
the near future. See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 281, at 165-74 (discussing the cases 
permitting “overbreadth” challenges under the First Amendment). 
335 See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979) (explaining the  
importance of the gag rule for grand jury testimony, noting that “[f]ear of future retribution or 
social stigma may act as powerful deterrents to those who would come forward and aid the grand 
jury in the performance of its duties”); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-
82 (1958) (“One [reason for maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings] is to encourage all 
witnesses to step forward and testify freely without fear of retaliation.”). 
336 Cf. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 633-36 (1990) (holding that publication of grand 
jury testimony may not be prohibited once the term of the grand jury is over).  
337 In the context of adult criminal trials, the Court has held that even if the prosecutor and 
the defendant agree to make the proceedings confidential, the First Amendment allows interested 
third parties (such as the press) to object on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. 
v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 505-08 (1984) (discussing the importance of open trials 
and explaining their origin in pre–Norman Conquest England); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-73 (1980) (chronicling the history of the modern trial and the 
presumption of openness and noting that “[t]his is no quirk of history; rather, it has long been 
recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial”). 
338 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (holding that the requirement 
that a former CIA agent get the CIA’s approval prior to publishing a memoir regarding his time at 
the agency was not an unconstitutional restraint on free speech, because the agent had voluntarily 
signed an agreement to that effect both at the commencement and at the termination of his 
employment). 
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are also based on consent, as when parties agree not to disclose the existence 
of a civil action or, more commonly, the settlement of a civil action. 340F339 Civil 
commitment and juvenile justice proceedings are also often confidential. 
Typically, though, the party against whom the action is directed, due to the 
sensitive nature of the information about him or her that may be revealed, 
fully supports maintaining the confidentiality of the proceeding. Given that 
government employees and parties to lawsuits can consent to secrecy, 
Dodd–Frank’s gag rule is presumably justifiable as applied to Treasury 
Department or FDIC officials, as well as to court personnel, because these 
officials have consented to preserve confidential information pertaining to 
their public functions. 341F340 But threatening officers or directors of a targeted 
firm with criminal punishment for disclosing truthful information about a 
court proceeding in which they are involuntarily involved is different. When 
the government brings a civil action against a party and that party seeks to 
disclose truthful information about the proceeding, there is little precedent 
suggesting that the party can be criminally punished for doing so.  
A possible analogy is provided by the National Security Letters (NSLs) 
authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act. 342F341 The Act allows the government 
to issue NSLs requesting records from wire or electronic communications 
providers as part of an investigation of potential terrorist activity and 
prohibits those service providers from disclosing that such information has 
been requested.343F342 The Second Circuit has held that there can be a compelling 
governmental interest in preserving the confidentiality of NSLs, 344F343 but the 
relevant First Amendment authority requires that any such restraint on 
speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest in 
confidentiality. 345F344 The court further concluded that the government must 
bear the burden of proving, in each case, that there is good reason to believe 
that disclosure of a NSL would jeopardize a national security investigation.346F345 
 
339 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1984) (holding that a protective 
order prohibiting a newspaper from publishing information that it had obtained through civil 
discovery procedures did not offend the First Amendment).  
340 See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465-66 (1995) (recognizing 
that “Congress may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be 
plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large”). 
341 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
342 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a), (c) (2012). 
343 See generally John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2009). 
344 Id. at 871.  
345 See id. at 883 (upholding the nondisclosure requirement only when “senior FBI officials 
certify that disclosure may result in an enumerated harm that is related to an authorized investigation 
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There are, of course, significant differences between the nondisclosure 
requirement in the PATRIOT Act and Dodd–Frank. One question is 
whether the governmental interest in preserving the confidentiality of an 
OLA petition is as compelling as that in preserving the secrecy of an 
investigation aimed at preventing terrorism. If one assumes premature 
disclosure of an OLA proceeding could trigger widespread financial panic, 
the answer is presumably yes. A financial panic would be devastating to the 
national economy, inflicting damage of a different sort than a terrorist 
attack, but nevertheless something to be equally avoided if possible.  
Another question under Dodd–Frank is whether the First Amendment 
requires a case-specific justification of the need for secrecy, as the Second 
Circuit held in the context of a NSL. 347F346 Dodd–Frank, in its current form, 
does not require the government to demonstrate the need for confidentiality 
each time it initiates an OLA proceeding. Congress apparently assumed 
that confidentiality would always be required in order to prevent a financial 
crisis analogous to a run on the bank. But this assumption is not necessarily 
correct. One can imagine a case in which the insolvency of a systemically 
significant nonbank financial firm is publicly known before the government 
commences an OLA proceeding, perhaps because the firm has filed for 
bankruptcy. In such a case, news of the firm’s failure would already have 
been absorbed by the market, and it is not clear why application of the gag 
rule would be necessary. So perhaps an individualized justification of 
secrecy ought to be required in the OLA context, too. 
There is a more fundamental reason why Dodd–Frank’s gag rule fails the 
narrow tailoring requirement. When enacting the statute, Congress had the 
option of structuring the OLA like an ordinary bank receivership, providing 
for plenary judicial review of the decision to appoint a receiver ex post 
rather than ex ante. Allowing for judicial hearing only after appointment of 
the receiver eliminates any need for secrecy, as well as any need for a rush to 
judgment and the other problems previously considered in connection with 
a due process or Article III challenge. Once again, we see that the Senate’s 
injection of a federal district court into the process of appointing a receiver 
was an unforced error generating constitutional problems that could have 
readily been avoided. 
 
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities” (citation and 
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V. TAKINGS ISSUES 
We conclude with a discussion of takings issues presented by Dodd–Frank. 
Title II contains a number of provisions that could conceivably give rise to 
takings claims. It is difficult to speak with any certainty about how these 
might be resolved because, short of outright seizure or destruction of a 
recognized property right by the government, takings claims are resolved 
under an ad hoc regime that critically depends on the specific facts presented.348F347 
We will briefly note some situations that seem particularly likely to generate 
future takings claims and then offer a more complete analysis of the largest 
takings issue looming on the horizon: impairment of secured creditor claims 
to avoid taxpayer-funded bailouts.  
Tracking the language of the Constitution,349F348 takings claims can potentially 
present four issues: (1) Does the claimant have an interest in “private 
property?” (2) Has the government “taken” this property? (3) If so, was the 
taking for a “public use?” (4) Has the government made adequate provision 
to provide “just compensation” for the taking? 350F349  
Of these four issues, the “public use” question is the least likely to be 
contested. Most would agree that vigorous government action to prevent or 
forestall a financial crisis—the very premise for exercising Title II authority—
is a legitimate public use. 351F350 To be sure, just because the Title II process as a 
whole satisfies the public use requirement, it does not necessarily follow 
that every seizure of property undertaken pursuant to a Title II proceeding 
is also for a public use. Still, assuming there is some nexus between the 
seizure and the purposes of Title II, a public use challenge will likely fail. 352F351 
The “property,” “taking,” and “just compensation” issues are more likely to 
 
347 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (characterizing the 
Court’s approach to resolving takings claims as “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”). 
348 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without 
just compensation.”).  
349 For an overview of these four issues, see generally DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. 
MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 58-209 (2002). 
350 The Supreme Court has defined public use broadly to include public benefit or  
advantage. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480-81 (2005) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has historically defined the “public purpose” as needed to justify exercise of 
eminent domain power broadly, reflecting the longstanding policy of judicial deference to 
legislative judgments in this field); see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note 349, at 191-98 (tracing 
emergence of the broad definition). 
351 The public use issue must ordinarily be resolved before the taking occurs, because the 
taking should be enjoined if the government cannot proffer a public use rationale. See generally D. 
Zachary Hudson, Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280 (2010). Dodd–Frank’s OLA 
provisions offer no clear mechanism to raise the public use issue before the seizure of a financial 
firm. If a claimant has a legitimate public use objection, this would be an additional constitutional 
reason to condemn the statute. 
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arise, if and when the OLA is used and an aggrieved stakeholder elects to 
pursue a takings claim.  
A. Some Possible Takings Claims 
1. Assessments 
Given its desire to avoid anything resembling a bailout of failed financial 
firms, Dodd–Frank requires repayment if Treasury funds are used to 
support a financial firm during the resolution process. 353F352 The first source of 
repayment is the firm’s stakeholders: shareholders are wiped out and 
unsecured creditors have their claims reduced, to zero if necessary. If this 
still leaves a debt to the Treasury, then Dodd–Frank provides that the 
FDIC can impose “assessments” on a broad list of financial institutions. 354F353 
Those eligible to be tapped include any bank holding company with at least 
fifty billion dollars in assets, any nonbank financial company subject to 
systemic risk oversight under Title I, and any other “financial company” 
with assets of at least fifty billion dollars.355F354  
Financial firms that are assessed to pay for the resolution of some other 
insolvent financial firm may argue that such a monetary exaction constitutes 
an unconstitutional taking of property. Although the Supreme Court has 
not enforced the principle for many decades, older authority exists for the 
proposition that special assessments disproportionate to any benefits 
conferred constitute takings. 356F355 Today, a threshold question would be 
whether such a general monetary liability can be challenged as a taking at 
all. The Court has held that the Takings Clause applies only to takings of 
identified property rights or the imposition of monetary liabilities tied to 
identified property rights and does not apply to general financial liabilities, 
such as taxes, fines, or fees. 357F356 A general assessment, if not tied to particular 
assets of financial firms, seems to fall on the “general liability” side of the line.  
 
352 Dodd–Frank Act § 204(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(d) (2012). 
353 Id. § 210(o)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1)(B). 
354 Id. § 210(o)(1)(A), (D)(ii)(II), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1)(A), (D)(ii)(II). 
355 See, e.g., Vill. of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 279 (1898) (“[T]he exaction from the 
owner of private property of the cost of a public improvement in substantial excess of the special 
benefits accruing to him is, to the extent of such excess, a taking, under the guise of taxation, of 
private property for public use without compensation.”); cf. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. 
Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 435 (1905) (permitting assessments based on general 
criteria such as frontage footing). For a discussion of the evolution of federal law on special 
assessments, see Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 
YALE L.J. 385, 469-73 (1977).  
356 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013) (holding 
that the demands for money at issue in the case operated upon an identified property interest by 
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Whether or not the Takings Clause applies, the government will likely 
argue that liability for such assessments is analogous to a constitutionally 
permissible special tax to help redress a problem unique to the industry 
being taxed, such as a tax on chemical feedstock to pay for hazardous waste 
cleanups. 358F357 A financial firm that objects to paying assessments would likely 
stress the unfairness of forcing it to fund a general public good—prevention 
of a financial crisis—when there is no required finding that it was at fault or 
even causally connected to behavior that gave rise to the crisis. Whether this 
argument would succeed if framed as a takings claim is doubtful but not 
entirely implausible. 359F358 
 
directing the owner of a particular piece of property to make a monetary payment, which 
constituted a monetary obligation burdening the petitioner’s ownership of a specific parcel of 
land); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540-42 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment 
and dissenting in part) (finding that the Coal Act did not present a takings issue because it did not 
“operate upon or alter an identified property interest”); id. at 554-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing that “[t]his case involves not an interest in physical or intellectual property, but an 
ordinary liability to pay money, and not to the Government, but to third parties,” and hence the 
Takings Clause does not apply). For an argument that general financial obligations should be 
immune from scrutiny under the Takings Clause, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of 
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 974-78 (2000). 
357 An earlier version of the Dodd–Frank Act provided for the creation of such a fund, supplied 
by taxes on qualifying financial firms. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1609(n)-(o) (2009) (creating a $150 billion “Systemic Dissolution 
Fund” funded by ex ante assessments on financial firms with more than $50 billion in assets). The 
Senate’s version also provided for assessments on large financial companies, but these would be 
imposed ex post. 156 CONG. REC. S4078, § 210(n)-(o) (daily ed. May 20, 2010). This divergence 
was almost certainly motivated by the Senate’s desire to reduce the perception that the statute 
contemplated taxpayer-funded bailouts. See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, FINANCIAL 
REFORM: 2010, PREPARING FOR THE HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE ON H.R. 4173 38-39 (2010), 
available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/PreparingForHouse-Senate 
ConferenceOnHR4173.pdf (noting that the House’s version contained no explicit prohibitions on 
the use of taxpayer funds to prevent the liquidation of a covered financial company). Similarly, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or, 
as more commonly known, Superfund), as originally enacted, provided for a tax on chemical 
companies. Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 4461, 94 Stat. 2767, 2798-99 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4661 
(1982)) (imposing a tax on certain chemicals); id. at § 4481, 94 Stat. at 2804 (1980) (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 4681 (1982)) (imposing a tax on receipt of hazardous waste). These taxes, in turn, 
supplied a fund for cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Id. § 221, 94 Stat. at 2801-02 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 9631 (1982)) (establishing a “Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund”); id. § 232, 94 
Stat. at 2804-05 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9641 (1982)) (establishing a “Post-closure Liability Trust 
Fund”). The tax expired in 1995 and has not been reauthorized. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & 
MARK REISCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33426, SUPERFUND: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED 
ISSUES 10-11 (2006) (noting that the Superfund taxing authority expired on December 31, 1995). 
358 For an analogous argument, albeit in a dissenting opinion, see Pennell v. City of San Jose, 
485 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that forcing 
landlords to accept reduced rents based on “tenant hardship” when the landlord bears no 
responsibility for that hardship constitutes a taking). 
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2. Executive Pay Clawbacks 
 Dodd–Frank requires the removal of financial firm officers and directors 
if they are found to have been “responsible” for the company’s financial 
failure. 360F359 It also permits the FDIC to claw back any compensation those 
individuals received during the two-year period prior to the start of the 
receivership. 361F360 The clawback is not limited to excessive compensation nor is 
there any statutory requirement of specific misconduct on the part of the 
officer that produced inflated compensation. To the contrary, the statute 
instructs the FDIC to weigh the “financial and deterrent benefits” of a 
clawback against “the cost of executing the recovery.” 362F361 This seems to 
mandate a clawback whenever it would be cost effective to do so, without 
regard to the officer’s culpability or the size of his or her compensation package. 
Executives subject to such clawbacks might argue that Dodd–Frank goes 
far beyond traditional notions of avoidable preferences and fraudulent 
conveyances in bankruptcy,363F362 amounting to nothing more than an expropriation 
of their wealth in order to promote the general good of financial stability. 
The government would likely respond that Dodd–Frank’s executive claw-
backs are consistent with other recently enacted clawback provisions, 364F363 such 
as those in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 365F364 and the TARP legislation 366F365—both of 
which are generally recognized as equitable and fair. The outcome, again, is 
difficult to predict, and will likely turn on what a court deems the relevant 
baseline for establishing legitimate expectations about the vulnerability of 
executives to salary clawbacks. If the baseline is that of the Bankruptcy 
Code, executives would have a chance of prevailing; if the baseline traces 
more recent legislative trends, their chances diminish. 
 
359 Dodd–Frank Act § 204(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a)(2) (2012). 
360 Id. § 210(s)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(s)(1). 
361 Id. § 210(s)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(s)(2). 
362 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (2012) (allowing the trustee to avoid transfers made by the 
debtor to insiders between ninety days and one year of the debtor filing for bankruptcy); cf. id. 
§ 547(c) (prohibiting a trustee from avoiding a transfer that was made to any creditor in “a 
contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor”). 
363 See generally Spencer C. Barasch & Sara J. Chesnut, Controversial Uses of the “Clawback” 
Remedy in the Current Financial Crisis, 72 TEX. B.J. 922 (2009) (summarizing the use of clawback 
legal remedies in the recent financial scandals and predicting aggressive use of clawbacks in the 
future).  
364 See 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012) (requiring the forfeiture of certain payments received by 
CEOs and CFOs within twelve months of the release of any financial statement that has to be 
restated due to a reporting error resulting from “misconduct”). 
365 See 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(B) (2012) (requiring senior executives and other top paid  
employees to return any incentive compensation they received in connection with the release of 
favorable financial statements later found to be materially inaccurate). 
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3. Revival of Barred Actions 
 Dodd–Frank contains an unusual provision that allows the FDIC as 
receiver to bring tort claims on behalf of the entity in receivership, even 
though the statute of limitations for the state-based cause of action has 
expired. 367F366 The provision permits the FDIC to recover funds from former 
managers and others who allegedly caused financial loss to the covered 
financial firm. The covered claims include those arising from “fraud, inten-
tional misconduct resulting in unjust enrichment, or intentional misconduct 
resulting in a substantial loss to the covered financial company.” 368F367 Fraud 
and unjust enrichment are well-established common law causes of action; 
“intentional misconduct resulting in substantial loss,” however, is not, which 
makes the exact scope of this provision unclear. The statute of limitations 
must have expired within five years of appointing the FDIC as receiver for 
the claim to be eligible for revival.369F368  
Those targeted in such cases may claim that reviving a cause of action 
for damages previously barred by the statute of limitations is a taking of 
property. The Supreme Court has held that reviving actions barred by the 
statute of limitations is a taking, 370F369 but more often finds that such actions 
are not takings.371F370 Reviving liabilities previously barred by the statute of 
limitations interferes with the repose these statutes are designed to promote. 
Perhaps, not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has declared legislative 
revivals of liability unconstitutional under provisions other than the Takings 
Clause. 372F371 Thus, it is difficult to predict with any confidence how such 
legislative action reviving tort liability would ultimately be assessed today 
under a takings challenge.  
 
366 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(10)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(10)(C).  
367 Id. § 210(a)(10)(C)(ii), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(10)(C)(ii). 
368 Id. § 210(a)(10)(C)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(10)(C)(i). 
369 See, e.g., William Danzer & Co., Inc. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633, 637 
(1925) (finding that allowing the plaintiff to file a claim with the Interstate Commerce Commission 
previously barred by the statute of limitations “would be to deprive defendant of its property 
without due process of law in contravention of the Fifth Amendment”). 
370 See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1945) (“[I]t cannot be said 
that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of 
time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment.”). See generally Campbell v. Holt, 115 
U.S. 620 (1885) (distinguishing between actions to recover real or personal property, where the 
expiration of the statute of limitations confers a title by adverse possession or prescription, and 
actions to recover a debt, where the statute merely bars enforcement in court).  
371 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632-33 (2003) (holding that once the statute of 
limitations bars a criminal proceeding, reviving the prosecution violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217-19 (1995) (holding that once a federal court has 
dismissed an action as barred by a statute of limitations, legislation allowing the judgment to be 
reopened under a longer statute of limitations violates Article III). 
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B. Impairment of Security Interests 
The most significant takings issues potentially implicated by Dodd–Frank 
involve security interests. 373F372 In the quest to find sources of funding other 
than tax revenues to prop up financial firms undergoing resolution, the 
House bill, H.R. 4173, required certain secured creditors to take a haircut of 
up to ten percent of the value of their security interest if the “amounts 
realized from the resolution are insufficient to satisfy completely any 
amounts owed to the United States.” 374F373 Neither of the Senate bills nor the 
enacted statute includes such a provision. 375F374 In a tip of the hat to the House, 
the final version of the Act did include a section requiring the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council to conduct a study considering whether secured 
creditors should be required to take a haircut in future OLA proceedings. 376F375 
The study, completed in July 2011, recommended against amending the 
statute to permit impairment of security interests, largely on the ground 
that the other powers given by the Act are sufficient to avoid future taxpayer 
bailouts without going after secured creditors. 377F376 Given the Council’s advice, 
 
372 Unsecured claims are commonly reduced or disallowed in bankruptcy and other insolvency 
proceedings. See Andrew A. Wood, The Decline of Unsecured Creditor and Shareholder Recoveries in 
Large Public Company Bankruptcies, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 429, 436 (2011) (noting that recovery 
amounts in large public company bankruptcy cases in 2009 and 2010 declined to fifty-three cents 
on the dollar for general unsecured creditors, seventeen cents on the dollar for senior subordinate 
debt, and thirteen cents on the dollar for senior unsecured creditors). A state law that retroactively 
impairs unsecured creditors’ rights could give rise to a claim under the Contracts Clause. See 
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827) (Washington, J.), 292 ( Johnson, J.), 313 
(Thompson, J.), 331 (Trimble, J.) (seriatim opinions limiting the Contract Clause to impairments 
of existing contracts). But for purposes of the Takings Clause, unsecured claims are regarded as 
contract rights, not property rights, and hence impairment by the federal government through 
bankruptcy proceedings does not give rise to a Takings Clause issue. As previously noted, 
unsecured claims are regarded as property for due process purposes. See Tulsa Prof ’l Collection 
Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (finding that a cause of action against an estate for an 
unpaid bill qualified as an unsecured claim and that “[l]ittle doubt remains that such an intangible 
interest is property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
373 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
§ 1609(a)(4)(D)(iv) (2009). The interests that would have been subject to this haircut requirement 
were enforceable or perfected security interests in assets arising under qualified financial contracts. Id.  
374 Title II as enacted does, however, authorize the FDIC to prescribe rules and regulations 
concerning the “rights, interests, and priorities of creditors, counterparties, security entitlement 
holders, or other persons with respect to any covered financial company” subject to the OLA. 
Dodd–Frank Act § 209, 12 U.S.C. § 5389 (2012).  
375 Id. § 215 (not codified). 
376 FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON  
SECURED CREDITOR HAIRCUTS 30 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ 
Documents/report%20to%20congress%20on%20secured%20creditor%20haircuts.pdf. 
Former Secretary of the Treasury Geithner regards the proposed ten percent haircut as a 
“surefire panic accelerant.” GEITHNER, supra note 9, at 409. 
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an amendment of the law to permit impairment of security interests 
currently appears unlikely. Nevertheless, there is a very real possibility that 
Congress will demand the impairment of secured creditor rights in a future 
financial crisis in the interest of avoiding taxpayer liability.  
A security interest or a lien is essentially a contingent property right 
held by a creditor in specific assets owned by a debtor. 378F377 In terms of 
conventional property forms, security interests can be analogized to executory 
interests: they are a nonpossessory future interest that may or may not vest 
depending on some future contingency, which is often the debtor’s failure to 
satisfy the obligation owed to the creditor. 379F378 If the debt is repaid in a 
timely manner, the security interest is released. However, if the debt is not 
repaid on time, the security interest holder gains the right to seize or 
compel the sale of the property that secures the debt to generate funds to 
satisfy the debt. 380F379 
The Bankruptcy Code implicitly treats security interests like property 
rights that belong to the secured creditor, although the Code studiously 
avoids labeling the interests as “property.” In a liquidation proceeding, a 
secured creditor is entitled to the full amount of its secured claim. 381F380 The 
trustee in bankruptcy can either sell the property subject to the security 
interest, 382F381 in which case the security interest will follow the property, or 
sell the property free of the security interest, 383F382 using proceeds of the sale to 
satisfy the secured debt. 384F383 If the value of the asset is equal to or less than 
the unpaid balance due on the debt, the trustee can abandon the property to 
the security holder. 385F384 Security interests are subject to the automatic stay in 
bankruptcy, which potentially impairs the value of the security. 386F385 The Code 
requires the trustee to provide “adequate protection” to secured creditors to 
minimize losses due to the stay. 387F386  
 
377 See Douglas G. Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 VA. L. REV. 2249, 2257 (1994) 
(“Security interests under Anglo-American law have always been tied to particular assets. A 
creditor acquired an interest in a particular piece of real and personal property and looked to it 
first to obtain repayment.”). 
378 THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
808-10 (2d ed. 2012). 
379 Id.  
380 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (forbidding “strip[ping] down” a party’s 
claim when the claim is a secured lien and fully allowed under the Bankruptcy Code).  
381 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)-(c) (2012). 
382 Id. § 363(f ) . 
383 Id. § 363( j). 
384 Id. § 554. 
385 Id. § 362. 
386 Id. § 363(e). 
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Things are more complicated in a reorganization proceeding than in a 
liquidation proceeding. In a reorganization proceeding, the bankruptcy 
trustee (frequently the debtor in possession) can, with the approval of the 
bankruptcy court, decide that the specific asset in which a creditor holds a 
security interest is necessary to the success of the reorganized firm. 388F387 In 
this event, the court decides whether or not to keep the secured asset for the 
use by the reorganized firm. 389F388 However, if the court decides to let the firm 
keep the asset, the court must perform a valuation of the asset and give the 
secured creditor a substitute for its property right—a “secured claim to the 
extent of the value of such creditor’s interest.” 390F389 The Code again requires 
that secured creditors given these substitute rights must be given “adequate 
protection” to ensure that the secured creditors will receive an “indubitable 
equivalent” to the value of the property in which they previously held a 
security interest. 391F390 By allowing the bankruptcy court to substitute other 
assets of equivalent financial value for the security interest, the Code treats 
security interests as fungible assets equivalent to money and hence as an 
asset that the court can exchange for money.  
The Dodd–Frank Act follows the Bankruptcy Code in recognizing the 
distinctive status of security interests and that security interests are entitled 
to adequate protection without regard to the impact protecting such interests 
has on other creditors, or on larger objectives such as preventing the 
collapse of a systemically significant firm. 392F391 As in the Bankruptcy Code, the 
Dodd–Frank Act does not acknowledge that security interests are property 
or that the enlargement of a pool of assets through abrogation of security 
interests might raise constitutional questions. 393F392  
 
387 Id. § 362(d)(2), (g); see also Siobhan Rafferty, Chapter 11 Cases Under Section 362(d)(2): 
Does This Include Liquidation?, 1 BANKR. DEV. J. 159, 163-64 (1984) (describing the trustee’s high 
burden of proof on the issue that the property is essential to the reorganization). 
388 See, e.g., In re Terra Mar Assocs., 3 B.R. 462, 465-66 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980) (identifying 
the factors that the court should consider in determining whether the bankrupt debtor can retain a 
particular asset, including whether “(1) the secured creditor will suffer imminent and irreparable 
injury from the continuation of the stay, (2) the property [at issue] is necessary to effect a 
reorganization, and (3) there is a reasonable probability of a successful rehabilitation within a 
reasonable time” (citation omitted)). 
389 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012). 
390 Id. § 361; id. § 362(d)(1); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).  
391 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(3)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(3)(B) (2012) (“The receiver shall 
allow any [secured] claim . . . which is proved to the satisfaction of the receiver.”). 
392 Academic commentary about security interests frequently ignores the status of such  
interests as property and hence the possible relevance of the Takings Clause. For example, some 
commentators have argued that secured creditors lack adequate incentives to monitor distressed 
firms and that eliminating the absolute priority rule for secured creditors would encourage better 
monitoring. See Baird, supra note 377, at 2259 (citing scholarly opinions explaining when departures 
from the absolute priority rule may be warranted). Other scholars have worried that secured 
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While Dodd–Frank generally favors preserving security interests, Title 
II deviates, in certain respects, from the way security interests are treated in 
bankruptcy. The clearest example concerns setoffs, where a creditor holds 
funds of an insolvent debtor and then seeks to take those funds as full or 
partial satisfaction of an unpaid claim. 394F393 The Bankruptcy Code treats 
setoffs as a type of secured claim; 395F394 Dodd–Frank does not. 396F395 Therefore, it 
is foreseeable that some creditors holding a setoff which is denied treatment 
as a secured claim will argue that this is a taking of property. The question 
is whether this type of deviation from the treatment of security interests in 
bankruptcy—or other reductions in secured creditor rights in response to 
demands for alternative sources of funding for resolutions of systemically 
significant firms—could be challenged as a taking.  
Under the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that security 
interests are “property” protected by the Takings Clause. The Court so held 
in a series of Depression-era cases under the Frazier–Lemke Act397F396 and in a 
later decision involving the abrogation of a materialman’s lien398F397 and more 
 
creditors will leave insufficient assets in a bankrupt enterprise to satisfy the claims of nonadjusting 
creditors such as tort claimants. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case 
for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 934 (1996) (arguing that “full 
priority causes excessive use of security interests, reduces the incentive of firms to take adequate 
precautions . . . and distorts the monitoring arrangements chosen by firms and their creditors”). 
Both arguments presuppose that the absolute priority rule for security interests can be modified 
without implicating the Takings Clause.  
393 See Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (“The right of setoff (also 
called ‘offset’) allows entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each 
other, thereby avoiding ‘the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A.’” (quoting Studley v. 
Boylston Nat’l Bank of Bos., 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913))). 
394 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012). 
395 Dodd–Frank Act § 210(a)(7)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(7)(B). The Bankruptcy Code does 
not grant setoff rights per se; creditors’ setoff rights are governed by state law. See Strumpf, 516 
U.S. at 18 (noting that under the Bankruptcy Code, “whatever right of setoff otherwise exists is 
preserved in bankruptcy”). Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code preserves setoff rights and 
acknowledges that a creditor has the right of setoff under state law. 11 U.S.C. § 553. Section 
506(a)(1) treats valid setoff rights as a secured claim. See id. § 506(a)(1) (“An allowed claim of a 
creditor . . . is a secured claim . . . to the extent of the amount subject to setoff . . . .”).  
396 11 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1934) (permitting a farmer to amend his bankruptcy petition and 
retain possession of his property under certain alternative payment schemes), invalidated by 
Louisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Radford, 295 U.S. at 601-02 (finding 
that the Frazier–Lemke Act violated the Fifth Amendment by taking property rights from a bank 
without just compensation); see also Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of 
Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937) (upholding an amended version of the Frazier–Lemke Act as 
causing a reasonable modification of property rights). 
397 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 45-46 (1960) (determining that the petitioners 
possessed “compensable property interests within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment”); see also 
United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1982) (construing a provision of the 
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recently reaffirmed these holdings. 399F398 These decisions nevertheless leave 
many unanswered questions.  
One question is whether the status of security interests as property is 
subject to prospective modification by legislation or regulatory pronounce-
ment. 400F399 There is a strong suggestion in United States v. Security Industrial 
Bank, a decision arising under the Bankruptcy Code, that prospective 
modification of the degree of protection afforded to security interests in 
bankruptcy would not be a taking. 401F400 This might mean, for example, that 
creditors who obtain setoff rights after the enactment of Dodd–Frank’s Title 
II cannot claim that the failure to treat these rights as property for  
bankruptcy purposes is a taking, because Title II announced to the world 
that henceforth these rights would not be treated as such. Setoff rights are 
close enough to the line between property and contract rights (which are 
subject to compromise or even disallowance in bankruptcy) that this kind of 
reclassification may be permissible. It is less clear whether an announcement 
by Congress (or a federal agency) modifying the absolute priority given to 
security interests in bankruptcy would be enough to immunize the government 
from any takings claims arising in security interests created thereafter. At 
least with respect to interests in land, the Court has been reluctant to regard 
every newly legislated or regulated land use restriction as an immediate 
qualification of property rights, such that persons who acquire  
restricted property in the future are automatically barred by the  
 
Bankruptcy Reform Act to apply only to liens created in the future in order to avoid the constitu-
tional question whether abrogating an existing lien would be a taking). 
398 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013) (“[T]he  
government must pay just compensation when it takes a lien—a right to receive money that is 
secured by a particular piece of property.”); id. at 2600 (referring to the taking of a lien as a “per se 
taking”). 
399 Compare James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights in Reorganization: 
A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 973, 1006-09 (1983) (arguing that Congress has complete discretion to modify the priority or 
other treatment of secured creditor rights under the Bankruptcy Clause without raising constitu-
tional issues), with Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 FLA. L. REV. 851, 893 (1999) 
(arguing that prospective modification of secured creditor rights that go beyond settled  
background principles of property law can give rise to takings liability). 
400 The Court specifically reserved the question whether a provision of the Bankruptcy  
Reform Act would apply to security interests established after the Act was passed but before it 
became effective. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 82 n.11. But the Court did not similarly reserve the 
question whether the amendment would apply to a security interest established after the Act 
became fully effective. In effect, the Court implicitly assumed the provision could be applied in a 
fully prospective fashion, notwithstanding diminished protection for security interests in 
bankruptcy.  
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restriction. 402F401 The Court has acknowledged that property rights are qualified 
by “background principles” of property law, such as the understanding that 
landowners can be barred from engaging in uses that create nuisances. 403F402 
However, the question whether changes in positive regulations that affect 
property automatically qualify as background principles has been met with 
inconsistent responses, 404F403 leaving considerable uncertainty about how the 
Court would respond to a law that prospectively modified the absolute 
priority of security interests. Delays in foreclosure proceedings have been 
around for a long time and might qualify as “background principles”; 405F404 
subordination of security interests to avoid taxpayer bailouts, on the other 
hand, might be regarded as a novelty that does not so qualify.  
Another question is how haircuts of security interests or other modifications 
in the rights of security interest holders should be analyzed in terms of total 
or partial takings. Armstrong v. United States held that the total destruction 
of a security interest is a taking, 406F405 anticipating the analysis of Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council 407F406 in terms of real estate. But if Congress or the 
FDIC as receiver shaves ten percent off the principal value of a security 
interest in order to reimburse the federal treasury for temporarily financing 
a failing firm, would this be regarded as a total taking of ten percent of the 
security or only a partial, ten percent taking of the security? In the case of 
land, shaving ten percent off the existing acreage is regarded as a total 
 
401 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629-30 (2001) (declining to recognize a 
per se rule that land use regulations in effect at the time of purchase qualify property rights and 
are immune from constitutional challenge by subsequent landowners); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992) (holding that, in takings cases brought by a landowner, the 
State would need to show that the landowner’s actions violated background principles of nuisance 
and property law in order to sustain a claim that no taking occurred); see also Phillips v. Wash. 
Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998) (holding that a regulatory requirement imposed on client 
funds held in trust by lawyers did not qualify the common law understanding that interest follows 
principal). 
402 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.  
403 Compare Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (holding that notice of regulation does not automatically 
disqualify a takings claim), with Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-08 (1984) 
(treating notice of regulation as virtually dispositive of takings claim). 
404 See Forrester, supra note 399, at 882-85 (surveying cases involving foreclosure delays as 
potential takings). 
405 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (“The total destruction by the Government of all value of these 
liens, which constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth Amendment 
‘taking.’”). 
406 505 U.S. at 1031-32 (holding that any regulation that destroys all economically beneficial 
value of real property is a taking unless it tracks the common law of nuisance in the relevant 
jurisdiction). 
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taking of ten percent. 408F407 But imposing a use regulation on the land that 
reduces its value by ten percent is only a partial taking and is typically not 
compensable. 409F408 This distinction might suggest, by analogy, that imposing a 
ten percent haircut on secured interest holders would be a taking, whereas a 
regulation that diminished the value of the security by ten percent (perhaps 
by imposing a moratorium on foreclosure) would not be. 
Still more questions are presented about what constitutes just compensation 
when security interests are impaired. For example, must compensation be 
paid for the time value of money when recovery of the equivalent value of 
the secured interest is delayed by a resolution process? Under the Bankruptcy 
Code, the Court has held, as a matter of statutory construction, that value 
lost due to delay is not compensated. 410F409 But the matter might come out 
differently when framed as a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The constitutional questions presented by Dodd–Frank’s orderly liquidation 
authority can be seen either as a dark portent of an inverted constitutional 
order or as a set of easily avoidable mistakes caused by careless last-minute 
drafting.  
The dark vision goes something like this: The U.S. Constitution, like 
American law more generally, is designed for a world in which the government 
is seen as a potential threat to private rights, but private rights are not 
individually significant enough to pose a threat to government or society 
more generally. The Constitution was not designed for a world in which 
some privately owned firms are “systemically significant” such that special 
rules must be devised to allow the government to take them over and 
operate them if those firms take on too much risk and are in danger of 
collapse. In order to construct a world in which a central function of the 
government is to protect society from firms that are too big to fail, while 
nevertheless permitting such firms to continue to exist, constitutional rules 
 
407 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421-22, 441 (1982) 
(holding that a regulation that permitted a cable television company to permanently install cable 
lines and small cable boxes on the roof of a building was categorically a taking despite its limited 
intrusiveness). 
408 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498-500 (1987)  
(concluding that a percentage of coal subject to a regulation did not constitute “a separate segment 
of property for takings law purposes”). 
409 See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 
377-79 (1988) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not require compensation for the time value 
of a secured interest). 
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must be fundamentally adjusted. Conventional norms of due process, 
understandings about the proper functioning of courts, limits on the 
legislative power reflected in the Bankruptcy Clause, and even free speech 
rights must give way. Property rights must be dissolved into a general mass 
of claim rights, subject to reallocation by the government in order to 
advance its perception of the requirements of the general welfare. If the 
Constitution is supposed to be a bulwark that protects us from our government, 
is the Dodd–Frank Act a foretaste of what to expect when the government 
becomes the handmaiden of a financial oligarchy? 
A more benign vision would stress that most of Dodd–Frank’s constitutional 
problems stem from a single ill-considered decision by the Senate to 
abandon the judicial review provisions in the Obama administration’s draft 
and the House bill in favor of a novel scheme calling for appointment of a 
receiver by an Article III court. The Administration’s Combined Draft and 
the House bill called for administrative appointment of a receiver, coupled 
with a right of plenary post-seizure judicial review. Had Congress adhered to 
this conception, which was borrowed from existing banking law, it would 
have eliminated serious due process questions, Article III questions, and the 
need for a gag rule that raises potential First Amendment questions. 
Constitutional issues arising under the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity 
requirement could have been laid to rest by drafting a more rule-like and less 
discretionary conception of what type of firm is eligible for resolution under 
Title II. Additionally, the various takings issues could have been avoided or 
made more manageable by tracking more closely to established common law 
and bankruptcy law precepts regarding clawbacks, assessments, and the 
status of security interests.  
These enumerated revisions are relatively minor in the larger scheme of 
things. They suggest that Dodd–Frank’s orderly liquidation authority is not 
too big for the Constitution—if only Congress had given sufficient  
consideration to the Constitution when it drafted this complex and  
far-reaching legislation. 
 
